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Abstract	  	  In	   response	   to	   the	   crisis	   of	   2008	   and	   deep	   recession	   that	   followed,	   the	   UK	  government	  assigned	  key	   importance	  to	  the	  need	  to	   ‘spatially	  rebalance’	   the	  economy,	   to	   reduced	   its	   dependence	   on	   London	   and	   the	   South	   East	   by	  ‘powering	   up’	   northern	   cities.	   	   This	   paper	   argues	   that	   the	   UK’s	   problem	   of	  spatial	  economic	  imbalance	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  long-­‐standing	  one,	  the	  very	  persistence	  of	  which	  raises	  key	  issues	  for	  our	  theories	  of	  regional	  development	  and	  policy.	  	  It	   argues	   that	   neither	   the	   new	   spatial	   economics,	   with	   its	   obsession	   with	  agglomeration,	   nor	   regional	   studies,	   with	   its	   plethora	   of	   concepts	   and	  paradigms	   but	   lack	   of	   integration	   and	   synthesis,	   offers	   a	   particularly	  convincing	   basis	   for	   devising	   policies	   capable	   of	   redressing	   the	   spatial	  imbalance	  in	  the	  UK’s	  economic	  landscape.	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1.	  Introduction:	  The	  Concern	  over	  Spatial	  	  	  	  	  Economic	  Imbalance	  	  The	  year	  2014	  marked	  the	  75th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  first	  publication	  of	  August	  Lösch’s	  classic	  work,	  The	  Economics	  of	  Location	  (1939;	  translated	  into	  English	  in	   1954).	   	   Few	   read	   Lösch’s	   book	   these	   days.	   	   If	   there	   is	   one	   classic	   author	  who	   has	   exercised	   a	   notable	   influence	   on	   economic	   geography,	   regional	  studies	  and	  spatial	  economics	  over	  recent	  years,	  it	  would	  of	  course	  be	  Alfred	  Marshall.	   Directly	   or	   indirectly,	   his	   comments	   on	   industrial	   districts	   and	  localisation	  economies	  have	  helped	  shape	   the	  growth	  over	  recent	  years	  of	  a	  voluminous	   literature	   on	   topics	   ranging	   from	   clusters,	   to	   local	   knowledge	  spillovers,	   to	   external	   economies,	   to	   agglomeration.	   	   By	   comparison,	   Lösch	  has	  received	  hardly	  any	  mention.	  	  	  This	   is	   somewhat	   curious,	   since	   Marshall’s	   main	   interests	   were	   not	   in	  economic	   geography	   or	   regional	   development:	   in	   fact,	   his	   discussions	   of	  industrial	  districts	  were	  far	  from	  central	  to	  his	  overall	  economic	  schema,	  and	  occupy	   only	   small	   sections	   of	   his	  work	   (Martin,	   2006).	   Lösch,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	  explicitly	  sought	   to	  provide	  an	  encompassing	  conceptual	   framework	  –	  albeit	  a	  general	  equilibrium	  schema	  -­‐	  for	  understanding	  the	  spatial	  economy,	  covering	   not	   just	   industrial	   location,	   but	   also	   trade,	   regional	   economic	  networks,	   cities,	   and	   certain	   financial	   aspects	   of	   the	   economic	   landscape,	   in	  particular	   geographical	   variations	   in	   interest	   rates,	   credit	   and	   consumer	  prices.1	  	  	  	  	  No	  doubt	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  Lösch’s	  ideas	  and	  approach	  have	  long	  been	  superseded.	   After	   all,	   the	   disciplines	   of	   regional	   studies,	   regional	   science,	  regional	   economics,	   economic	   geography	   and	   urban	   economics	   have	   all	  moved	   on	   leaps	   and	   bounds,	   theoretically	   and	   empirically,	   since	   the	   time	  Lösch	  was	  writing,	  and	  economic	  circumstances	  now	  are	  much	  different	  from	  what	  pertained	  then.	  Nevertheless,	  his	  concluding	  statement	  surely	  continues	  to	  capture	  well	  what	  modern	  regional	  studies	  is	  (or	  should	  be)	  all	  about:	  	  	   If	  everything	  occurred	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  development.	   If	  everything	   existed	   in	   the	   same	  place	   there	   could	   be	   no	  particularity.	   Only	  space	  makes	   possible	   the	   particular,	  which	   then	   unfolds	   in	   time.	  …	   To	   let	  this	   space-­‐conditioned	   particularity	   grow,	   without	   letting	   the	   whole	   run	  wild	   –	   that	   is	   political	   art	   (Epilogue:	  On	  Space,	  The	  Economics	   of	   Location,	  1954	  English	  edition,	  p.	  508;	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  It	  was	  his	  intention	  to	  write	  a	  sequel	  to	  The	  Economics	  of	  Location,	  on	  money	  and	  the	  space	  economy,	  but	  alas	  he	  died	  prematurely	  before	  he	  could	  do	  so.	  	  He	  did	  write	  an	  extended	  essay	  on	  certain	  aspects	  of	  money,	  Theorie	  der	  Währung,	  which	  was	  published	  after	  his	  death,	  but	  to	  my	  knowledge	  this	  has	  never	  been	  translated	  into	  English.	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  In	  fact,	  I	  suggest,	  this	  statement	  resonates	  closely	  with	  the	  circumstances	  we	  currently	   face	   in	  many	  advanced	  economies.	   	  For	  over	   the	  past	   two	  to	   three	  decades,	   a	   very	   particular	   model	   of	   economic	   growth	   has	   been	   pursued	   in	  many	   advanced	   nations	   that	   has	   indeed	   been	   allowed	   to	   ‘run	   wild’,	  culminating	  in	  the	  worst	  crisis	  since	  the	  early-­‐1930s.	  	  This	  Neoliberal	  growth	  model,	   which	   took	   hold	   from	   the	   early-­‐1980s	   onwards,	   founded	   on	  deregulation	   and	  privatization,	   and	  more	   recently	   also	  on	   cheap	   credit,	  was	  hailed	  as	   finally	  bringing	  an	  end	  to	  recessions	  and	   inflation,	  and	  ushering	   in	  what	   became	   labeled	   as	   the	   ‘Great	  Moderation’	   in	   the	  US	   (Bernanke,	   2004),	  and	   a	   new	   ‘NICE’	   era	   (of	   non-­‐inflationary	   continued	   expansion)	   in	   the	   UK.2	  	  Above	   all,	   it	   was	   a	  model	   driven	   by	   a	   dramatic	   and	   seemingly	   unstoppable	  expansion	   of	   finance,	   banking,	   and	   household	   debt.	   	   	   Banks	   made	   record	  profits,	  the	  world’s	  financial	  centres	  prospered,	  and	  many	  regions	  and	  cities,	  indeed	  whole	  nations,	  experienced	  rapid	  growth	  on	  the	  back	  of	  the	  booming	  housing	  and	  real	  estate	  markets	  that	  the	  banks	  were	  eager	  to	  fund	  and	  profit	  from.	  	  In	  the	  UK,	  the	  financial	  success	  of	  London	  was	  openly	  celebrated	  by	  the	  Labour	  Government	  at	   the	  time,	  and	  even	  held	  up	  as	  a	  model	   for	   the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  to	  follow:	  	  	   I	  believe	  it	  will	  be	  said	  of	  this	  age,	  the	  first	  decades	  of	  the	  21st	  century,	  that	  out	  of	  the	  greatest	  restructuring	  of	  the	  global	  economy,	  perhaps	  even	  greater	  than	  the	  industrial	  revolution,	  a	  new	  world	  order	  was	  created….	  [M]ost	  importantly	  of	  all	   in	   the	  new	  world	  order,	   as	   the	  City	   [of	  London]	  bears	  witness,	  Britain's	  great	  natural	   resource	  are	  our	  people	   -­‐	   resourceful,	   enterprising,	   innovative	   -­‐	  the	  foundation	  on	  which	  we	  will	  compete	  successfully.…	  	  	  The	  financial	  services	  sector	  in	  Britain,	  and	  the	  City	  of	  London	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  it,	  is	  a	  great	  example	  of	  a	   highly	   skilled,	   high	   value	   added,	   talent	   driven	   industry	   that	   shows	   how	  we	  can	   excel	   in	   a	  world	   of	   global	   competition.	   Britain	   needs	  more	   of	   the	   vigour,	  ingenuity	   and	   aspiration	   that	   you	   [London’s	   financial	   class]	   already	  demonstrate	   is	   the	   hallmark	   of	   your	   success	   (Chancellor	   Gordon	   Brown,	  Mansion	  House	  Speech,	  June	  20,	  2007)	  	  No	  sooner	  had	   this	  praise	  been	   lavished,	  however,	   than	   the	  economic	  boom	  on	   which	   it	   was	   based	   was	   brought	   to	   an	   abrupt	   halt.	   The	   financial	   crisis	  revealed	   the	   boom	   for	  what	   it	  was,	   a	   form	   of	   development	   that	  was	   highly	  
unbalanced:	  on	  a	  global	  level,	  between	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  nations	  (especially	  China	  and	  the	  USA	  respectively);	  and	  within	  countries,	  between	  consumption	  and	   investment,	   between	   services	   and	   production,	   between	   state	   revenues	  and	  spending,	  between	  rich	  and	  poor,	  and,	  spatially,	  between	  different	  cities	  and	  regions.	  	  For	  while	  the	  long	  boom	  between	  the	  early-­‐1990s	  and	  2007	  may	  have	   lifted	   most	   regions	   and	   cities,	   it	   lifted	   some	   much	   more	   than	   others.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   The	   acronym	  NICE	   is	   usually	   attributed	   to	   the	   former	   Governor	   of	   the	   Bank	   of	   England,	  Mervyn	  King.	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Indeed	   in	   some	   instances,	   and	   the	   UK	   is	   a	   particularly	   prominent	   case,	   it	  reinforced	  regional	  inequalities.	  And	  in	  others,	  while	  it	  seemingly	  gave	  much–needed	  momentum	   to	   lagging	   regions	   and	   cities,	   that	  momentum	   has	   since	  proved	   to	   be	   precarious,	   especially	   in	   the	   post-­‐crisis	   era	   of	   fiscal	   austerity.	  	  And	   to	   compound	   matters,	   policy-­‐makers	   in	   many	   countries	   appeared	   to	  assume	   that	   the	   boom	   in	   national	   growth	   would	   itself	   reduce	   spatial	  disparities	  in	  prosperity.	  	  In	  effect,	  politically,	  economic	  growth	  was	  allowed,	  in	   fact	   actively	   encouraged,	   to	   ‘run	   wild’	   regardless	   of	   its	   spatial	  consequences.	  	  I	  wonder	  what	  Lösch	  would	  have	  made	  of	  all	  this.	  	  	  Crises,	   of	   course,	   inevitably	   provoke	   a	   search	   for	   causes,	   and	   debate	   over	  remedies	  and	  alternative	  ways	  forward.	  	  The	  crisis,	  rightly,	  has	  thrown	  much	  of	   economics	   	   -­‐	   especially	   mainstream	   economics	   -­‐	   into	   disarray	   and	  disrepute.	   	   Reforms	   to	   the	   banking	   and	   financial	   system,	   though	   much	  trumpeted,	  have	  been	  slow,	  piecemeal	  and	  far	  from	  radical.	  	  Meanwhile,	  much	  of	   the	  Neoliberal	   project	   has	   remained	  unscathed.	   In	   fact,	   in	   some	   senses	   it	  has	   been	   reinforced.	   The	   new	   politics	   of	   austerity,	   of	   cutting	   public	  expenditure	  on	  a	  scale	  not	  seen	  since	  the	  interwar	  years,	  might	  be	  prosecuted	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  reducing	  public	  debt	  and	  imposing	  fiscal	  prudence,	  but	  it	  also	  resonates	  closely	  with	  the	  fundamental	  objective	  of	  Neoliberal	  ideology,	  of	  cutting	  back	  the	  state,	  and	  especially	  the	  welfare	  state	  (Konzelman,	  2014).	  	  	  	  Yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  crisis	  has	  evinced	  a	  new	  spatial	  awareness	  amongst	  policy-­‐makers.	   From	   the	   World	   Bank,	   to	   the	   OECD,	   to	   the	   European	  Commission,	   to	   national	   governments,	   policy-­‐makers	   have	   become	   more	  aware	   of	   economic	   geography,	   of	   the	   geographical	   foundations	   of	   national	  economic	  growth	  and	  development.	  In	  the	  UK,	  spatially	  unbalanced	  growth	  is	  now	  recognized	  politically	  both	  as	  having	  contributed	  to	  the	  economic	  crisis	  and	   also	   as	   a	   hindrance	   to	   future	   economic	   stability.	   A	   new	   mantra	   of	  ‘rebalancing	   the	   economy’	   has	   been	   prosecuted	   as	   necessary	   to	   secure	  sustained	   recovery,	   and	   it	   is	   now	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   UK	  economy	  has	  been	  too	  dependent	  on	  a	  narrow	  range	  of	  activities	  –	  especially	  finance	  –	  and	  on	  one	  corner	  of	   the	  country,	  namely	  London	  and	  the	  Greater	  South	  East:	  	   Our	   economy	   has	   become	   more	   and	   more	   unbalanced,	   with	   our	   fortunes	  hitched	   to	   a	   few	   industries	   in	  one	   corner	  of	   the	   country,	  while	  we	   let	   other	  sectors	  like	  manufacturing	  slide.	  Today	  our	  economy	  is	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  just	  a	  few	  industries	  and	  a	  few	  regions	  –	  particularly	  London	  and	  the	  South	  East.	  This	  really	  matters.	  An	  economy	  with	  such	  a	  narrow	  foundation	  for	  growth	  is	  fundamentally	  unstable	  and	  wasteful	  –	  because	  we	  are	  not	  making	  use	  of	  the	  talent	  out	   there	   in	  all	  parts	  of	  our	  United	  Kingdom.	  We	  are	  determined	   that	  should	   change.	   That	   doesn’t	   mean	   picking	   winners,	   but	   it	   does	   mean	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supporting	  growing	  industries…	  And	  it	  doesn’t	  mean	  ignoring	  London…	  but	  it	  does	  mean	  having	   a	  plan	   to	  breathe	   economic	   life	   into	   the	   towns	   and	   cities	  outside	  the	  M25	  (David	  Cameron,	  UK	  Prime	  Minister,	  28	  May,	  2010)	  	  	  The	  UK	  government’s	  initial	  response	  was	  to	  prosecute	  a	  new	  localism,	  a	  new	  ‘local	  growth	  agenda’	  (H.M	  Government,	  2010).	  Local	  Enterprise	  Partnerships	  (to	   replace	   the	   previous	   Regional	   Development	   Agencies)	  were	   established,	  together	  with	  a	   regional	   growth	   fund,	   local	   enterprise	   zones,	   city	  deals,	   and	  various	   other	   measures,	   all	   intended	   to	   promote	   local	   growth	   and	   greater	  spatial	   balance	   across	   the	   economy.	   	   And	   then,	   as	   the	   inevitable	   political	  warm-­‐up	  began	   for	   the	  General	  Election	   in	  May	  2015,	  both	   the	  UK	  Coalition	  Government	   and	   the	  Labour	  opposition	   suddenly	  discovered	   that	   important	  cities	  exist	  not	   just	  outside	  London,	  beyond	  the	  M25,	  but	   in	  the	  North	  of	  the	  country.	   From	  mid-­‐2014	   onwards,	   the	   Chancellor	   George	  Osborne	   began	   to	  talk	   of	   his	   offensive	   to	   promote	  what	   he	   called	   a	   ‘northern	   powerhouse’	   to	  rival	  London	  in	  scale	  and	  dynamism:	  	   Something	   remarkable	  has	  happened	   to	  London	  over	   these	   recent	  decades.	   It	  has	   become	   a	   global	   capital,	   the	   home	   of	   international	   finance,	   attracting	   the	  young,	   the	   ambitious,	   the	   wealthy	   and	   the	   entrepreneurial	   from	   around	   the	  world	  in	  their	  tens	  of	  thousands.	  And	  it’s	  a	  great	  strength	  for	  our	  country	  that	  it	  contains	  such	  a	  global	  city…	  	  But	  something	  remarkable	  has	  happened	  here	  in	  Manchester,	   and	   in	   Liverpool	   and	   Leeds	   and	   Newcastle	   and	   other	   northern	  cities	   over	   these	   last	   thirty	   years	   too.	   The	   once	  hollowed-­‐out	   city	   centres	   are	  thriving	  again,	  with	  growing	  universities,	   iconic	  museums	  and	  cultural	  events,	  and	   huge	   improvements	   to	   the	   quality	   of	   life…	   	   The	   cities	   of	   the	   north	   are	  individually	   strong,	  but	  collectively	  not	   strong	  enough.	  The	  whole	   is	   less	   than	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  parts.	  So	  the	  powerhouse	  of	  London	  dominates	  more	  and	  more.	  And	  that’s	  not	  healthy	  for	  our	  economy...	  We	  need	  a	  Northern	  Powerhouse	  too.	  Not	  one	  city,	  but	  a	  collection	  of	  northern	  cities	  -­‐	  sufficiently	  close	  to	  each	  other	  that	  combined	  can	  take	  on	  the	  world	  (George	  Osborne,	  2014)	  	  However,	  as	  the	  above	  two	  quotes	  indicate,	  the	  UK	  Government	  has	  also	  been	  anxious	   that	   the	   growth	   of	   London	   is	   not	   hindered	   or	   compromised	   in	   any	  way.	  	  Herein	  lies	  a	  key	  conundrum:	  how	  to	  achieve	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  ‘spatial	  balance’	  in	  the	  economy	  whilst	  also	  wanting	  to	  protect	  and	  enhance	  the	  gains	  from	   spatial	   agglomeration	   of	   economic	   activity	   and	   growth	   in	   the	   already	  prosperous	  London-­‐South	  East	  region.	   	  Much	  of	   the	  debate	  surrounding	  this	  issue	  has	   revolved	   around	  a	   stark	  question:	   “is	   London	  good	  or	  bad	   for	   the	  rest	   of	   the	  UK”?	  On	   the	   one	   side	   are	   those	  who	  point	   to	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	  Greater	   London	   economic	   machine	   in	   generating	   demand	   for	   goods	   and	  services	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  UK,	   as	   a	   vital	   source	  of	   export	   earnings,	   and	   as	   a	  major	   contributor	   to	   the	   taxes	   needed	   to	   help	   fund	   welfare	   payments	   and	  public	  spending	  across	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole	  (see	  for	  example,	  City	  of	  London	  Corporation,	  2011,	  2014).	  But	  on	  the	  other	  side	  are	  those	  who	  see	  London	  as	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akin	   to	   a	   ‘country	   apart’,	   even	   a	   quasi-­‐independent	   ‘city-­‐state’,	   as	   a	   region	  which	  has	  become	  increasingly	  detached	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  in	  terms	  of	  its	   level	   of	   prosperity,	   its	   economic	   growth,	   its	   global	   orientation,	   and	   its	  cyclical	  behaviour	  (Deutsche	  Bank,	  2013).	   	  Some	  go	  further,	  and	  regard	  it	  as	  having	   become	   a	   sort	   of	   ‘economic	   black	   hole’,	   sucking	   in	   key	   human	   and	  financial	   resources	   from,	   and	   to	   the	   detriment	   of,	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   country.	  Indeed,	  as	  Vince	  Cable,	  as	  the	  Coalition	  Government’s	  own	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Innovation	  and	  Skills	  opined:	  	  	   One	   of	   the	   big	   problems	   that	   we	   have	   at	   the	   moment…	   	   is	   that	   London	   is	  becoming	  a	  kind	  of	  giant	  suction	  machine,	  draining	  the	   life	  out	  of	   the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  (Cable,	  2013).	  	  	  	  	  A	  similar	  view	  was	  subsequently	  voiced	  by	  Scotland’s	  First	  Minister:	  	   London	  has	  a	  centrifugal	  pull	  on	  talent,	  investment	  and	  business	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  and	  the	  world.	  That	  brings	  benefits	  to	  the	  broader	  UK	  economy.	  But	  as	  we	  know,	  that	  same	  centrifugal	  pull	  is	  felt	  by	  the	  rest	  of	  us	  across	  the	  UK,	  often	  to	  our	  detriment.	  The	  challenge	  for	  us	  all	   is	  how	  to	  balance	  this	   in	  our	  best	   interests	   –	   not	   by	   engaging	   in	   a	   race	   to	   the	   bottom,	   but	   by	   using	   our	  powers	   to	   create	   long-­‐term	   comparative	   advantage	   and	   genuine	   economic	  value	  (Sturgen,	  2014).	  	  	  Certainly	   in	   the	   cities	   and	   regions	   outside	   London	   there	   is	   a	   widespread	  feeling	   that	   their	   conditions	   and	   needs	   are	   not	   taken	   into	   account	   or	  responded	  to	  by	  national	  politics	  and	  policymaking,	  much	  of	  which	   is	  highly	  London-­‐centric	  (Wilcox,	  Nohrova	  and	  Bidgood,	  2014).	  	  	  Although	  arguments	  about	  the	  economic	  ‘balance	  sheet’	  between	  London	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  are	  hampered	  by	  a	  serious	  lack	  of	  data	  on	  the	  flows	  of	  trade	  and	   finance	   between	   the	   regions	   and	   cities	   of	   the	   country,	   the	   fact	   is,	   of	  course,	   that	   economic	   growth	   is	   not	   some	   simple	   ‘spatial	   zero-­‐sum	   game’	  (Martin,	   2008;	   Gardiner,	   Martin	   and	   Tyler,	   2010).	   There	   is	   not	   some	   fixed	  amount	  of	  economic	  growth	  or	  activity	   that	  has	   to	  be	  distributed	  across	   the	  national	  space	  economy.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  holding	  back	  prosperous	  areas	  like	  the	  London-­‐Greater	  South	  East	  region	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  activity	  in	  the	  less	  prosperous	  cities	  and	  regions	  of	  the	  country.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  ensuring	  that	  the	   less	  prosperous	  regions	  and	  cities	  are	  able	   to	  realize	   their	   full	  economic	  potential.	  To	  do	  this	  they	  need	  proper	  and	  fair	  access	  to	  the	  public	  and	  private	  resources	   necessary	   to	   gain	   ‘second	   wind’,	   to	   use	   Paul	   Krugman’s	   (2005)	  graphic	  phrase.	  	  And	  this	  means	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  examine	  whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  economic,	  financial	  and	  political	  power	  is	  too	  concentrated	  in	  London;	  whether	  the	  ‘economic	  playing	  field’,	  far	  from	  being	  level,	  is	  too	  tilted	  in	  London’s	  favour.	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  These	  issues	  have	  a	  salience	  far	  beyond	  the	  UK.	  	  Not	  dissimilar	  concerns	  and	  debates	  about	  spatial	  economic	  imbalance	  and	  disparity	  can	  be	  found	  across	  the	  European	  Union,	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  China,	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  Europe,	  for	  example,	  has	  exposed	  major	  divisions	  between	  those	  member	  states	  inside	  the	  monetary	  union,	  and	  those	  outside;	  and	  within	  the	  Eurozone	   itself,	   between	   the	   stronger	   more	   central	   regions,	   especially	   in	  Germany,	   and	  weaker	  more	   peripheral	   regions,	   such	   as	   in	   Italy	   and	   Greece	  (Fingleton,	   Garretsen	   and	   Martin,	   2014).	   	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   strong	  centralized	   fiscal	   stabilisation	  mechanism,	   the	   existence	   of	  marked	   regional	  economic	  disparities	  across	  the	  Eurozone	  is	  a	  weak	  aspect	  of	  monetary	  union	  (see	   Martin,	   2001),	   and	   compounds	   the	   problem	   of	   recovering	   from	   the	  recession	   that	   continues	   to	   afflict	   many	   of	   the	   Eurozone	   members.	   	   At	   the	  same	  time,	  many	  larger	  cities	  across	  Europe	  have	  seen	  a	  slowdown	  in	  relative	  growth	  (Dijkstra,	  Garcliazo	  and	  McCann,	  2013),	  while	   in	  the	  USA	  the	  growth	  and	   development	   paths	   of	   cities	   appear	   to	   have	   become	   increasingly	  divergent	  (Markusen	  and	  Schrock,	  2006;	  Hobor,	  2013;	  Storper,	  2013;	  Storper	  et	   al,	   2014;	   Moretti,	   2013).	   Spatial	   economic	   imbalances	   are	   a	   prominent	  feature	  of	  many	  countries,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  have	  widened	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  	  I	   want	   to	   argue	   in	   this	   paper	   that	   spatial	   economic	   imbalance	   in	   the	   UK,	  despite	   the	  Government’s	  portrayal	  of	   it	  as	  a	   recent	  development,	   is	  but	   the	  latest	   manifestation	   of	   a	   long-­‐standing	   and	   systemic	   feature	   of	   the	   British	  model	  of	  national	  political	  economy.	  	  As	  such	  it	  poses	  a	  fundamental	  problem,	  and	   its	   resolution	   presents	   a	   major	   challenge	   for	   both	   regional	   theory	   and	  regional	  policy.	   	  Just	  how	  should	  we	  theorise	  persistent	  spatially	  unbalanced	  growth,	  and	  what	  sort	  of	  policy	  response	  is	  called	  for?	  Is	  regional	  studies	  in	  a	  position	  to	  provide	  convincing	  answers	  to	  these	  sorts	  of	  questions?	  My	  worry	  is	   that	   it	   is	   not;	   or	   rather,	   that	   despite	   its	   impressive	   array	   of	   concepts,	  perspectives	   and	   ideas,	   it	   lacks	  both	   the	   integration	   and	  normative	   features	  necessary	   to	   provide	   a	   coherent	   and	   convincing	   framework	   capable	   of	  addressing	   the	   big	   questions	   relating	   to	   uneven	   regional	   growth	   and	  development.	  	  For	  these	  and	  other	  reasons,	  it	  has	  lost	  out	  to	  the	  ‘new	  spatial	  economics’	   which	   seems	   to	   have	   captured	   much	   of	   the	   policy	   discourse	  surrounding	  the	  issue	  of	  spatial	  economic	  imbalance.3	  	  But	  before	  addressing	  these	  worries	  in	  more	  detail,	  let	  me	  briefly	  examine	  the	  scale	  of	  imbalance	  in	  the	  UK,	  my	  empirical	  focus	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   As	   will	   be	   discussed	   below,	   I	   use	   the	   term	   ‘new	   spatial	   economics’	   to	   include	   the	   New	  Economic	  Geography	  (NEG)	  and	  the	  New	  Urban	  Economics	  (NUE).	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2.	  	  Spatial	  Imbalance	  in	  the	  UK	  Economy:	  The	  Rediscovery	  of	  a	  Long-­‐Standing	  Problem	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  is	  that	  the	  current	  issue	  of	  spatial	   imbalance	  in	  the	  UK	  economy	   is	   hardly	   new,	   but	   merely	   a	   rediscovery	   of	   a	   long-­‐entrenched	  problem.	   Estimates	   by	   leading	   economic	   historians	   (see	   Lee,	   1979;	   Crafts,	  2005;	   Geary	   and	   Stark,	   2012)	   reveal	   that	   even	   by	   the	   middle	   of	   the	   19thC,	  London	   had	   come	   to	   dominate	   the	  map	   of	   relative	   prosperity	   in	   the	   UK,	   by	  some	   margin	   (see	   Table	   1).	   Over	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   19thC	   into	   the	   first	  decades	   of	   the	   20thC,	   regional	   economic	   disparities	   in	   Britain	   widened	  significantly,	   with	   London	   and	   the	   surrounding	   South	   East	   pulling	   further	  ahead	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	   	   	  The	  degree	  of	  imbalance	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  highly	  uneven	  regional	  impact	  of	  the	  economic	  upheavals	  and	  crises	  of	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s.	  	  While	  the	  staple	  export	  industries	  that	  had	  formed	  the	  economic	  base	  of	  much	  of	  northern	  Britain	  in	  Victorian	  times	  were	  losing	  out	  	  
	  
Table	  1:	  	  Spatial	  Imbalance	  in	  the	  British	  Economy,	  1871-­2001:	  	  
Regional	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  Relative	  to	  the	  Great	  Britain	  Average	  (GB=100)	  	  
GB=100 1871 1911 1971 1981 1991 2001 
 
London 147.3 165.6 123.4 126.0 129.7 132.4 
South East 88.5 124.6 104.6 108.4 117.1 123.5 
East Anglia 97.0 76.8 92.8 94.7 113.7 117.9 
South West 88.6 85.7 93.9 91.8 92.4 91.0 
East Midlands 106.2 90.6 95.7 95.6 95.2 91.2 
West Midlands 84.8 78.4 101.9 95.6 89.4 89.4 
Yorks-Humberside 91.3 76.2 92.5 90.2 88.6 84.1 
North West 106.0 97.2 95.3 92.9 90.5 89.6 
North  94.1 89.5 86.1 92.2 90.6 78.9 
Wales 87.7 90.1 87.5 82.0 84.1 78.2 
Scotland 89.9 102.1 92.2 94.8 100.1 93.5 
Coefficient of Variation (%) 17.7 24.9 10.5 11.6 13.1 16.6 
 
Source	  of	  Data:	  Crafts	  (2005).	  Northern	  Ireland	  is	  omitted	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  consistent	  comparable	  historical	  data.	  The	  estimates	  for	  1991	  and	  2001	  have	  been	  adjusted	  from	  present	  regional	  boundaries	  to	  be	  comparable	  with	  the	  old	  standard	  regions.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  estimates	  are	  derived	  mainly	  from	  individual	  tax	  returns,	  and	  hence	  are	  essentially	  residence	  based.	  	  to	  more	  modern	  or	  cheaper	   international	  competition,	   the	  emergence	  of	   the	  new	  mass	   consumer	   goods	   growth	   industries	   of	   the	  period	  overwhelmingly	  benefited	  London	  and	  the	  South	  East:	  according	  to	  Scott	  (2007),	  for	  example,	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during	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s	  London	  and	  the	  South	  East	  attracted	  no	  less	  than	  75	  percent	  of	  all	  new	  manufacturing	  establishments.	  	  The	   resultant	   scale	   of	   spatial	   economic	   imbalance,	   and	   particularly	   the	  concentration	  of	  relative	  growth	  and	  prosperity	  in	  London,	  was	  highlighted	  in	  the	  famous	  Report	  of	  the	  Barlow	  Commission	  in	  1940,	  in	  terms	  that	  were	  not	  a	   little	  controversial,	  and	  which	  resonate	  uncannily	  with	  the	  view	  expressed	  seventy	  five	  years	  later	  by	  Vince	  Cable	  referred	  to	  above:	  	   The	  contribution	  in	  one	  area	  of	  such	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  national	  population	  as	  is	  contained	  in	  Greater	  London,	  and	  the	  attraction	  to	  the	  Metropolis	   of	   the	   best	   industrial,	   financial,	   commercial	   and	   general	  ability,	   represents	   a	   serious	   drain	   on	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   country	   (Barlow	  Commission,	  1940,	  para.	  171).	  	  	  As	  Barlow	  saw	   it,	   there	  was	  a	  strong	  case	   for	  spatial	   rebalancing	   the	  British	  economy,	   and	   this	   required	   deliberate	   Government	   intervention.	   His	  arguments	   for	   redistributing	   economic	   activity	   away	   from	   London	   to	   the	  northern	  regions	  of	  the	  UK	  had	  a	  major	  influence	  on	  the	  regional	  policy	  model	  introduced	  after	   the	  War,	   and	  which	  held	   sway	  until	   the	   end	  of	   the	  1970s.4	  Over	   this	   period,	   from	  1945	   to	   the	  mid-­‐	   to	   late-­‐1970s,	   the	   scale	   of	   regional	  disparity	  in	  Britain,	  especially	  as	  between	  London	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country,	  declined	  somewhat.5	  How	  far	  this	  was	  due	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  regional	  policy	  is	  an	   issue	  of	   some	  debate.	  But	  what	   is	  clear	   is	   that	  by	   the	  early-­‐1970s,	  as	   the	  long	   post-­‐war	   boom	   came	   to	   an	   end,	   the	   degree	   of	   regional	   economic	  imbalance	  across	  the	  UK	  had	  fallen	  (Table	  1).	  	  	  	  Since	   then,	   however,	   and	   particularly	   since	   the	   early-­‐1990s,	   regional	  disparities	   have	   widened	   dramatically	   once	   again,	   as	   economic	   growth	   in	  London	   and	   the	   South	   East	   has	   outstripped	   that	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   country	  (Figure	   1	   and	   Table	   2;	   see	   also	   Martin,	   2010;	   Gardiner,	   Martin	   and	   Tyler,	  2013;	  Deutsche	  Bank,	  2013).	  	  Taking	  the	  period	  since	  1971,	  and	  using	  the	  UK	  Government	  Office	  regions	  which	  replaced	  the	  old	  Standard	  Regions	  in	  Table	  1,	   by	   2011	   a	   cumulative	   growth	   gap	   in	  GVA	  of	   nearly	   40	   percentage	   points	  had	   opened	   up	   between	   the	   southern	   and	   northern	   halves	   of	   the	   country	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   In	   essence,	   this	   policy	   model	   was	   a	   combination	   of	   restrictions	   on	   new	   and	   expanded	  factory	   development	   in	   the	   south	   east	   of	   the	   country	   (Industrial	   Development	   Certificates)	  combined	  with	  various	  capital	  grants	  for	  investments	  in	  premises	  and	  equipment	  made	  in	  the	  designated	  assisted	  areas	  of	  northern	  and	  peripheral	  UK.	  
5	  Various	  estimates	  have	  been	  made	  of	  the	  numbers	  of	  new	  jobs	  created	  by	  regional	  policy	  in	  the	  depressed	  areas	  of	   the	  UK	   from	  the	  1950s	   to	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1970s.	  But	  producing	  such	  estimates	   is	   fraught	   with	   methodological	   problems,	   not	   least	   agreeing	   a	   meaningful	  counterfactual	  of	  what	  employment	  trends	  in	  these	  assisted	  regions	  would	  have	  been	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  policy.	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(Figure	  2).	   	   This	   is	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘North-­‐South	  Divide’;	   and	  while	   this	  notion	  obviously	  obscures	  what	  at	   a	   local	   scale	   is	   inevitably	  a	  much	  more	   complex	  picture,	  the	  epithet	  is	  not	  without	  validity	  	  (Martin,	  2004).6	  	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  growing	   gap	   between	   ‘North’	   and	   ‘South’	   represent	   a	   significant	   permanent	  loss	  of	  output	  to	  the	  national	  economy,	  it	  has	  also	  meant	  lower	  incomes	  and	  employment	   opportunities	   in	   northern	   cities	   and	   regions	   themselves.	   The	  upshot	   is	   that	   together,	  London	  and	   the	  South	  East	  now	  make	  up	  almost	  37	  percent	  of	  the	  national	  economy	  (in	  terms	  of	  their	  share	  of	  GDP),	  compared	  to	  26	   percent	   in	   1911.	  What	   is	   abundantly	   clear	   is	   that	   not	   only	   is	   the	   broad	  geographical	   imbalance	   in	   the	  UK	   economy	   a	   long-­‐standing	   and	  persistence	  feature,	  it	  is	  now	  greater	  than	  at	  any	  time	  in	  the	  country’s	  modern	  recorded	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Divergent	  Regional	  Growth	  across	  the	  UK,	  1990-­2011	  (Workplace	  
Based	  Gross	  Value	  Added	  in	  Constant	  2006	  prices),	  Indexed	  to	  1990=100	  
	  
Source	  of	  Data:	  Cambridge	  Econometrics	  Regional	  Economic	  Data	  Base	  
Note:	  The	  data	  are	  workplace	  based,	  and	  refer	  to	  where	  the	  output	  was	  produced,	  and	  not	  to	  where	  the	  incomes	  (or	  profits)	  associated	  with	  that	  output	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Table	  2:	  	  Spatial	  Imbalance	  in	  the	  UK	  Economy,	  1988-­2013:	  	  
Regional	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  Relative	  to	  the	  UK	  Average	  (UK=100)	  	  
  UK=100 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 
 
2013 
London 152 149 152 162 169 172 
South East 102 102 106 108 109 110 
East of England 97 95 99 100 97 94 
South West 93 92 89 92 92 91 
East Midlands 97 94 93 90 88 83 
West Midlands 93 92 93 88 85 83 
Yorks-Humberside 91 90 89 87 84 81 
North West 92 91 89 87 86 85 
North East  85 86 80 78     76     74 
Wales 85 84 79 76 72 72 
Scotland 99 101 96 94 96 94 
N Ireland 75 79 81 79 79 77 
Coefficient of Variation (%) 18.8 17.8 19.5 22.9 25.5 26.9 
	  
Source	  of	  Data:	  ONS.	  The	  currently	  used	  Government	  Office	  regions	  in	  this	  table	  differ	  slightly	  from	  the	  former	  old	  Standard	  Regions	  shown	  in	  Table	  1,	  and	  also	  include	  Northern	  Ireland.	  The	  data	  are	  also	  workplace	  based,	  rather	  than	  residence	  based.	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  The	  Cumulative	  Output	  (GVA)	  Growth	  Gap	  between	  the	  South	  and	  





Note:	  Difference	  between	  each	  area’s	  annual	  percentage	  growth	  rate	  and	  the	  UK	  average	  rate,	  cumulated	  over	  time.	  	  ‘South’	  –	  Greater	  London,	  South	  East,	  South	  West,	  East	  of	  England,	  East	  Midlands;	  ‘North’	  	  -­	  West	  Midlands,	  Yorkshire-­‐Humberside,	  North	  West,	  North	  East,	  Wales,	  Scotland	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	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  industrial	  history.	   	  And	  while	   the	  UK	   is	  not	  alone	   in	  experiencing	   increasing	  spatial	   imbalance,	   it	   does	   appear	   that	   the	   process	   has	   been	   much	   more	  pronounced	  there	  than	  in	  most	  other	  European	  countries	  (Table	  3).	  	  	  So	  why	  does	   spatial	   economic	   imbalance	  matter,	   and	  what	   is	   the	   case	   for	   pursuing	  greater	  spatial	  balance?	  	  	  	  
Table	  3:	  	  Spatial	  Imbalance	  in	  Selected	  EU	  Countries:	  Coefficient	  of	  Variation	  in	  
Regional	  GDP	  per	  Capita,	  (PPS,	  NUTS2	  Regions)	  	  
Coefficient of  
Variation (%) 
1980 2001 2011 
 
United Kingdom 0.31 0.36 0.45 
France 0.15 0.18 0.19 
Netherlands 0.17 0.20 0.21 
Italy 0.32 0.28 0.22 
Belgium 0.43 0.44 0.37 
Spain 0.14 0.19 0.15 
Greece 0.35 0.21 0.14 
Germany 0.35 0.23 0.23 
EU-15 0.32 0.28 0.33 	  
Source	  of	  Data:	  European	  data	  from	  Cambridge	  Econometrics,	  European	  Regional	  Data	  Base	  	  	  3.	  	  What	  is	  the	  Case	  for	  Spatial	  Economic	  Rebalancing?	  	  	  It	   would	   clearly	   be	   wholly	   unrealistic	   to	   expect	   indicators	   of	   economic	  performance	   and	   well-­‐being	   to	   be	   identical	   across	   geographic	   space.	   There	  will	  always	  be	  local	  and	  regional	  differences	  in	  economic	  structure,	  business	  types,	  workers’	  skills,	  technology,	  and	  the	  like,	  so	  we	  can	  never	  expect	  perfect	  equality	  of	  wages,	  per	  capita	  incomes,	  productivity	  and	  so	  on	  between	  regions	  or	   cities.	   	   The	   constant	   flux	   of	   the	  modern	   economy,	   driven	   by	   the	   ‘laws	   of	  coercive	   competition’	   (Harvey,	   2006)	   and	   by	   new	   knowledge	   and	  technologies,	   propels	   a	  perennial	   gale	   of	   ‘creative	  destruction’	   (Schumpeter,	  1942)	  that	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  be	  spatial	  neutral	   in	  its	   impacts;	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  barriers	  and	  frictions	  to	  the	  movements	  to	  labour,	  if	  not	  capital	  and	   knowledge,	   prevent	   the	   instantaneous	   self-­‐correcting	   adjustments	  beloved	  of	  free-­‐market	  economics.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  ‘perfect’	  spatial	  balance	  is	  an	  unachievable	   goal,	   and	   is	   at	   best	   an	   ideal	   or	   abstract	   ‘reference	   point’.	   	   But	  when	   the	   degree	   or	   level	   of	   spatial	   economic	   imbalance	   becomes	   large	   and	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entrenched,	  or	  increases	  over	  time,	  then	  it	  does	  become	  a	  source	  of	  concern,	  and	   raises	   questions	   over	   the	   use	   of	   human	   and	   physical	   resources,	   about	  spatial	  and	  individual	  equity,	  about	  opportunity,	  and	  about	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  costs	  that	  might	  be	  associated	  with	  such	  imbalance.	  	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  regional	  per	  income	  disparities	  across	  the	  UK	  have	  widened	  progressively	   in	  recent	  decades,	  and	  are	  amongst	   the	  highest	   to	  be	   found	   in	  the	  leading	  OECD	  countries.	  	  At	  the	  present	  time,	  	  per	  capita	  GDP	  in	  London	  is	  double	   that	   in	   the	   northern	   regions	   (Table	   3),	   and	   this	   level	   of	   core-­‐region	  dominance	  is	  noticeably	  greater	  than	  in	  any	  other	  European	  Union	  state.	  	  	  	  Now	  some	  spatial	  economists	  might	  well	  argue	  that	  the	  failure,	  for	  example,	  of	  factor	  prices	  and	  productivity	  to	  equalize	  across	  regions	  can	  nevertheless	  be	  given	  an	  equilibrium	  interpretation,	  and	  hence	   is	  not	  problematic.	   	  The	  very	  persistence	  of	  regional	  disparities	  might	  even	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  that	  some	  sort	   of	   ‘compensating	   differentials’	   mechanism	   is	   operating,	   for	   example	  workers’	   trade-­‐offs	   between	   income	   and	   amenity.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  persistent	  spatial	  inequalities	  need	  not	  be	  evidence	  of	  any	  sort	  of	  equilibrium.	  And	  even	  if	  regional	  economic	  imbalance	  is	  argued	  to	  be	  a	  market	  equilibrium	  outcome,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   it	  maximizes	   social	  welfare,	   or	   that	   some	  other	  alternative	  equilibrium	  that	  actually	  increases	  welfare	  is	  unachievable.	  Much	  depends	  on	  how	  we	  define	  the	  welfare	  function.	  	  	  Traditionally,	   discussions	   around	   the	   case	   for	   redressing	   regional	   economic	  disparities	   have	   tended	   to	   emphasise	   either	   economic	   efficiency	   or	   social	  equity.	   According	   to	   the	   first	   of	   these,	   persistent	   regional	   imbalances	   in	  economic	   activity	   are	   nationally	   inefficient,	   since	   the	   under-­‐utilization	   and	  underperformance	   of	   workers	   and	   productive	   capacity	   in	   ‘lagging’	   regions	  mean	  that	  national	  wealth	   is	   lower	   than	   it	  could	  otherwise	  be.	   	  Policies	   that	  raise	  the	  utilization	  and	  productivity	  of	  human	  and	  capital	  resources	  in	  such	  regions	   (without	   lowering	   the	   utilization	   and	   productivity	   of	   resources	   in	  ‘leading’	  regions)	  will	  thus	  raise	  the	  performance	  not	  only	  of	  ‘lagging’	  regions	  but	  also	  of	  the	  national	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  according	  to	  this	   view,	   reducing	   regional	   disparities	   also	   aids	   national	   economic	  management.	   For	   example,	   national	   expansion	   can	   be	   pursued	   without	  leading	   to	   full-­‐employment	   bottlenecks	   and	   inflationary	   overheating	   in	  certain	  (core)	  regions	  whilst	  significant	  under-­‐utilization	  of	  labour	  and	  capital	  still	   exists	   in	   others.	   	   	   The	   fact	   that	   certain	   other	   European	   countries	   have	  achieved	  comparable	  or	  even	  superior	  long-­‐run	  national	  growth	  rates	  to	  that	  of	   the	   UK	   whilst	   having	   significantly	   lower	   levels	   of	   spatial	   economic	  imbalance	  (smaller	  regional	  economic	  disparities),	  suggests	  that	  there	  may	  be	  real	   efficiency	   gains	   from	   securing	   greater	   spatial	   economic	   balance	   across	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the	  UK.	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  social	  equity	  argument,	  a	  strong	  case	  can	  be	  made	  for	  greater	  regional	  balance	  on	  welfare	  and	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  grounds,	  irrespective	  of	   economic	   efficiency	   imperatives.	   The	   underlying	   motivation	   here	   is	   the	  belief	   that	   individuals	   should	   not	   be	   seriously	   and	   systematically	   socially	  disadvantaged	  with	   respect	   to	   job	  opportunities,	   housing	   conditions,	   health,	  access	  to	  public	  services	  and	  the	  like,	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  living	  in	  one	  region	  rather	  than	  another.	  	  We	  know	  that	  areas	  which	  persistently	  suffer	  from	  low	  wages,	   inferior	   employment	   opportunities	   and	   job	   insecurity	   tend	   to	   have	  lower	  rates	  of	  educational	  attainment,	  higher	  rates	  of	  child	  poverty,	  ill-­‐health	  and	  crime,	  and	  lower	  life	  expectancy,	  than	  areas	  with	  high	  incomes	  and	  more	  favourable	   labour	   markets,	   and	   that	   such	   conditions	   can	   become	   self-­‐reproducing	  over	  time.	  	  	  It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  persistent	  unfavourable	  social	  and	   economic	   conditions	   in	   a	   region	   should	   encourage	   people	   to	   move	   to	  where	  such	  conditions	  are	  more	  favourable.	  But	  there	  is	  copious	  evidence	  to	  indicate	  that	  it	  tends	  not	  to	  be	  the	  unemployed,	  low	  skilled	  and	  low	  paid	  that	  readily	  undertake	  or	  are	  able	  to	  make	  such	  movements,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  the	  more	  skilled	  and	  enterprising	  workers	  who	  move.	   If	  maintained	  over	   long	  periods	  of	   time,	   the	  net	  exodus	  of	  such	  workers	   from	  slower	  growing	  regions	   to	   the	  faster	   growing	  more	   prosperous	   ones	  might	  well	   benefit	   the	   latter,	   but	  will	  seriously	   deplete	   the	   human	   capital	   base	   in	   the	   former.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  however,	   the	   persistent	   net	  movement	   of	   labour	   into	   the	  more	   prosperous,	  higher-­‐growth	   regions	   can	   create	   pressures	   on	   housing	   markets,	   public	  services,	  infrastructures	  and	  the	  like	  in	  such	  areas,	  which	  pressures	  may	  well	  then	   require	   additional	   public	   expenditures	   in	   those	   regions	   in	   order	   to	  prevent	  costs	  and	  congestion	  rising.	  	  	  Seeking	   greater	   spatial	   economic	   balance	   can	   thus	   help	   not	   only	   to	   raise	  national	  economic	  growth	  but	  also	  to	  secure	  social	  cohesion	  and	  citizenship,	  and	   reduce	   expenditures	   on	   welfare	   support	   measures,	   as	   well	   as	   serve	   to	  prevent	   inflationary	   pressures	   arising	   in	   core	   regions.	   In	   essence,	   the	  economic	   efficiency	   and	   social	   equity	   arguments	   can	   be	   argued	   as	   being	   as	  complementary	  and	  mutually	  beneficial,	  although	  the	  relative	  weight	  given	  to	  these	   two	   perspectives	   in	   policy-­‐discourse	   may	   depend	   on	   the	   prevailing	  political-­‐economic	   ideology.	   	   The	   basic	   point,	   however,	   is	   that	   national	  efficiency	  and	  social	  equity	  can	  be	   jointly	  supporting	  rationales	   for	  pursuing	  greater	  spatial	  balance	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  	  	  However,	   there	  has	   long	  been	  a	   strand	  of	   economic	   theory	   that	  has	   taken	  a	  different	  view,	   to	   the	  effect	   that	   there	   is	  a	   ‘trade-­‐off’	  between	  efficiency	  and	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equity:	  that	  securing	  greater	  social	  equity	  may	  come	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  lower	  rate	  of	   national	   growth.7	   Over	   recent	   years	   this	   	   ‘trade-­‐off’	   thesis	   has	   been	  challenged,	   both	   theoretically	   and	   empirically:	   for	   example,	   endogenous	  growth	  theory	  can	  be	  used	  to	  argue	  that	  in	  fact	  an	  economy	  with	  a	  more	  equal	  society	  (in	  terms	  of	  education,	  skills	  or	  incomes)	  will	  tend	  to	  grow	  faster	  over	  the	   long	   run	   than	   a	   more	   unequal	   one.	   And	   empirical	   evidence	   tends	   to	  support	  this	  prediction.	  	  	  	  But	  if	  this	  holds	  for	  social	  equity,	  why	  should	  it	  not	  hold	  also	  for	  spatial	  equity?	  	  Nevertheless,	  as	  I	  will	  elaborate	  below,	  ‘trade-­‐off’	  thinking	   is	   not	   far	   below	   the	   surface	   in	   some	   versions	   of	   the	   new	   spatial	  economics	   (including	   the	   New	   Economic	   Geography	   (NEG),	   wherein	   some	  adherents	  argue	  that	  greater	  spatial	  agglomeration	  of	  economic	  activity	  may	  benefit	  national	  growth,	  at	  least	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  spatial	   imbalance,	  so	  that	   policy	   intervention	   to	   reduce	   regional	   disparities	   is	   brought	   into	  question.	  	  	  	  There	   is	   then,	   a	   real	   need	   for	   regional	   studies	   scholars	   to	   engage	  with	   this	  issue,	  and	  to	  set	  out	  the	  arguments	  for	  reducing	  spatial	  economic	  disparities.	  	  While	   concern	   over	   such	   disparities	   is	   often	   there	   in	   the	   background,	   or	   is	  implied,	  it	   is	   less	  often	  confronted	  head	  on.	   	   	  In	  their	  concern	  to	  explore	  and	  elaborate	  the	  various	  factors	  that	  make	  for	  successful	  regional	  development,	  regional	   studies	   scholars	   have	   tended	   to	   let	   the	   normative	   question	   of	  regional	  socio-­‐economic	  equity	  slip	  to	  the	  background.	  	  Yet,	  persistent	  spatial	  disparities	   in	   socio-­‐economic	  opportunity	   and	  achievement	   raise	   real	   issues	  of	   social	   justice,	   issues	   that	   may	   not	   be	   readily	   reduced	   to	   or	   easily	  represented	   by	   model-­‐based	   welfare	   functions,	   efficiency-­‐equity	   trade-­‐off	  curves,	  and	  the	   like.	   	   	  Our	   theories	  of	  regional	  development	  should,	   then,	  be	  capable	   of	   explicitly	   considering	   the	   case	   for	   a	   more	   spatially	   balanced	  economy.	  	  	  	  	  	  4.	   The	  Limitations	  of	  Existing	  Theory,	   I:	   The	  New	  Spatial	  Economics	   -­‐	   An	   Obsession	   with	   Agglomeration	   and	  Equilibrium?	  	  Theoretical	   debate	   over	   the	   issue	   of	   balanced	   versus	   unbalanced	   economic	  growth	   is	   hardly	   new.	   	   Disagreement	   over	   the	   relative	  merits	   of	   each	   have	  long	  characterized	  development	  economics,	  where	  controversy	  goes	  back	   to	  the	  1940s	  and	  1950s.	  No	  sooner	  had	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘balanced	  growth’,	  defined	  as	  the	   simultaneous	   and	   coordinated	   expansion	   of	   several	   sectors,	   been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  classic	  source	  of	  this	  ‘trade-­‐off’	  idea	  is	  of	  course	  Okun	  (1975).	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proposed	  than	  it	  was	  countered	  by	  those	  advocating	  ‘unbalanced	  growth’,	  that	  is	   a	   model	   of	   growth	   based	   on	   concentrating	   resources	   in	   certain	   key	  specialisms.	   	   Some	   of	   this	   discussion	   spilled	   over	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   spatially	  balanced	   or	   unbalanced	   growth,	   and	   whether	   spatial	   imbalance	   may	   be	  inevitable	  and	  even	  desirable	  at	  early	  stages	  of	  national	  development,	  but	   is	  likely	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  spatially	  balanced	  growth	  at	  later	  stages.	  	  Embedded	  in	   these	   arguments	   were	   assumptions	   that	   eventually	   specialisation	   could	  lead	   to	   diversification	   via	   backward	   and	   forward	   linkages,	   and	   that	   spatial	  imbalance	  could	   lead	   to	   regional	   convergence	  via	  various	   ‘trickle	  down’	  and	  ‘spread	  effects’	  effects,	  though	  some	  authors	  accepted	  that	  such	  convergence	  might	   also	   require	   policy	   intervention	   (Myrdal,	   1957;	   Alonso,	   1968).	   	   	   Now	  most	  of	   this	  discussion	  referred	   to	  countries	  undergoing	  early	  development,	  not	  to	  advanced	  post-­‐industrial	  economies.	  	  But	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  the	  emphasis	   given	   to	   the	   advantages	   of	   spatial	   agglomeration	   –	   in	   effect	   to	  spatial	   imbalance	   –	   has	   received	   renewed	   attention	   in	   the	   new	   spatial	  economics,	   especially	   in	   New	   Economic	   Geography	  models	   (NEG)	   and	   New	  Urban	  Economics	  (NUE)	  models.8	  	  Though	   they	   differ	   in	   their	   specific	   theoretical	   foundations	   and	   focus,	   both	  NEG	   and	   NNUE	   models	   assign	   considerable	   importance	   to	   spatial	  agglomeration	   and	   equilibrium	   outcomes:	   the	   former	   mainly	   on	   core—periphery	  type	  patterns	  of	  regional	  economic	  activity,	  at	  all	  spatial	  scales;	  the	  latter	   mainly	   on	   the	   concentration	   of	   economic	   activities	   and	   jobs	   in	   cities,	  particularly	   large,	   dense	   cities.	   	  What	   links	   these	   two	   strands	   of	   theory	   is	   a	  stress	   on	   the	   benefits	   of	   various	   types	   of	   increasing	   returns	   effects	   and	  positive	   externalities	   that	   arise	   from	   the	   spatial	   agglomeration	   of	   firms	   and	  workers.9	  	  There	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  in-­‐built	  bias	  towards	  regional	  agglomeration	  and	  spatial	   economic	   imbalance	   in	   NEG	   models	   (Neary,	   2001;	   Garretsen	   and	  Martin,	  2010).	   	  Only	  at	  very	  high	  transport	  costs	  or	  other	  barriers	  to	  the	  free	  inter-­‐regional	  movement	  of	  goods,	  workers	  and	  firms,	  or	  where	  agglomeration	  rapidly	  generates	  congestion	  costs,	   is	  a	  balanced	  geographical	  distribution	  of	  economic	  activity	  a	  stable	  equilibrium	  outcome	  in	  these	  models.	   	  Where	  such	  costs	  or	  barriers	  are	  low,	  then	  a	  spatially	  balanced	  economic	  landscape	  (where	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	   In	   fact,	   in	   his	  Development,	   Geography	   and	   Economic	  Theory,	   Krugman	   (1995)	   argued	   for	  reviving	  the	  earlier	  work	  in	  development	  economics	  and	  linking	  it	  to	  economic	  geography	  via	  new	  advances	  in	  economic	  theory	  and	  modeling	  technique.	  	  	  	  
9	  At	   first	  glance,	   there	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  major	  distinction	  between	  NEG	  and	  NUE,	   in	  as	  much	   that	   the	   former	   seems	   to	   stress	   increasing	   returns	   to	   scale	   within	   firms,	   whilst	   the	  latter	   emphasises	   external	   increasing	   returns	   to	   city	   size	   and	   density.	   But	   in	   fact	   this	  distinction	  is	  often	  blurred,	  and	  one	  can	  find	  both	  types	  of	  increasing	  returns	  invoked	  by	  both	  camps,	  and	  some	  general	  expositions	  of	  agglomeration	   in	   the	  economic	   landscape	  meld	   the	  two	  in	  their	  accounts	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Fujita	  and	  Thisse,	  2002).	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economic	   activity	   is	   more	   or	   less	   equally	   distributed	   between	   regions)	   is	  potentially	   unstable,	   and	   the	   system	   is	   easily	   ‘tipped’	   into	   a	   spatially	  unbalanced	  distribution,	  with	   firms	  and	  workers	  concentrated	  mainly	   in	  one	  region.	  Furthermore,	  such	  an	  outcome	  is	  a	  stable	  equilibrium	  one.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  have	  been	  some	  serious	  attempts	  to	  move	  away	  from	  this	  agglomeration	  bias	   (see	   the	   discussion	   in	   Brakman,	   Garretsen	   and	  Marrewijk,	   2009),	   but	   a	  basic	  problem	  with	  all	  NEG	  models	   is	   that	   they	  only	  give	  clear	  cut	  analytical	  results	   in	   a	   two-­‐region	   setting,	   or	   at	   best	   a	   multi-­‐region	   setting	   where	   all	  regions	   (represented	   as	   spaceless	   points)	   are	   equi-­‐distant	   from	  one	   another	  (see	  Garretsen	  and	  Martin,	  2010).	  	  The	   key	   point	   is	   that	   in	   NEG	  work,	   spatial	   agglomeration	   (spatial	   economic	  imbalance)	  is	  seen	  not	  only	  as	  a	  logical	  market	  outcome	  under	  the	  presence	  of	  increasing	   returns	   and	   mobility	   of	   factors,	   but	   also	   one	   that	   is	   deemed	   to	  increase	  national	  overall	  growth,	  at	  least	  as	  long	  as	  congestion	  costs	  and	  other	  negative	   externalities	   do	   not	   become	   dominant	   (see	   Baldwin	   et	   al,	   2003;	  Coombes,	   Duranton	   and	   Gobillon,	   2012).	   In	   empirical	   work,	   typically	   the	  problem	  of	  congestion	  costs	  and	  other	  negative	  externalities	   is	  either	  played	  down,	  or	  else	  attributed	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  factors	  that	  are	  inhibiting	  the	  free	  play	  of	  market	  forces,	  such	  as	  planning	  rules	  restricting	  the	  supply	  of	   land	  in	  core	  regions	  (the	  agglomerations).	  	  	  	  In	   addition,	   although	   NEG	   models	   allow	   for	   certain	   types	   of	   inter-­‐dependencies	   between	   regions	   (in	   terms	   of	   the	   movement	   of	   workers	   and	  firms),	   and	   for	   certain	   (though	   highly	   restricted)	   forms	   of	   imperfect	  competition,	   they	   normally	   assume	   an	   economy	   with	   no	   State	   activity	   or	  public	  sector.	  	  In	  reality,	  or	  course,	  the	  spatial	  distribution	  of	  economic	  activity	  is	  highly	  influenced	  by	  the	  State,	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  spatial	  distribution	  of	  public	  expenditure,	  for	  example	  on	  infrastructure,	  on	  education,	  and	  so	  on,	  as	  well	  as	  by	   macro-­‐economic	   fiscal	   and	   monetary	   management.	   	   To	   the	   extent	   that	  public	   investment	   is	   spatially	   uneven	   it	   can	   serve	   to	   produce	   or	   reinforce	  spatial	   imbalances	  in	  economic	  growth.	   	  The	  State	  may	  undertake	  large	  scale	  transport	   investments	   in	   a	   particular	   region	   or	   city	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	  congestion	  costs;	  in	  so	  doing	  such	  expenditures	  may	  merely	  encourage	  further	  agglomeration	   and	   congestion	   in	   the	   area,	   which	   then	   require	   yet	   further	  public	   infrastructural	   spending,	   and	   so	   on.	   	   In	   the	   UK,	   London	   typifies	   this	  circular	   process.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   NEG	   models	   can	   be	   used	   to	   conduct	  valuable	   ‘what	   if’	   exercises	   (Martin	   and	   Sunley,	   2011a),	   to	   determine	   the	  possible	  (equilibrium)	  outcomes	  of	  deliberate	  public	  policy	  interventions	  such	  as	  public	  transport	  infrastructure	  investment	  between	  or	  within	  regions	  (such	  as	   the	  proposed	  High	  Speed	  2	   link	   from	  London	   to	  Birmingham,	  Manchester	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and	  Leeds	  in	  the	  UK).	   	  But	  in	  general,	  State	  spending	  and	  policy,	  or	  other	  key	  institutions	   such	   as	   the	   financial	   system,	   are	   not	   included	   as	   integral,	  structural	  components	  of	  the	  hypothetical	  spatial	  economies	  that	  typify	  NEG-­‐type	  models.	  	  These	   omissions	   and	   limitations	   notwithstanding,	   NEG	  models	   have	   exerted	  considerable	   influence	   on	   policy-­‐makers.10	   	   The	   arguments	   that	   spatial	  agglomeration	   is	   essentially	   a	   ‘natural’	   market-­‐driven	   process,	   that	   spatial	  imbalance	   in	   the	   economy	   is	   an	   equilibrium	   outcome	   and,	   moreover,	   a	  nationally	  efficient	  one	  that	  maximizes	  national	  growth,	  all	  play	  to	  a	  political	  disposition	  towards	  minimal	  intervention	  in	  the	  spatial	  economy.	  Indeed,	  the	  implication	   of	   NEG	   models	   is	   that	   policies	   that	   seek	   to	   reduce	   regional	  economic	  imbalance	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  nationally	  inefficient:	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  a	  policy	  ‘trade-­‐off’	  does	  indeed	  exist	  between	  the	  pursuit	  of	  national	  growth	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  spatial	  economic	  imbalance.	  One	  finds	  this	  strand	  of	  thinking	  in	   the	   World	   Bank’s	   report	   on	   global	   development,	   in	   OECD	   and	   European	  Commission	  papers	  on	  regional	  development,	  and	  in	  UK	  policy	  papers.	  	  As	  one	  exponent	  of	  these	  models	  puts	   it,	   in	  relation	  to	  regional	  economic	  disparities	  across	  the	  European	  Union:	  	   Spatial	  agglomeration	  of	  economic	  activities	  …	  may	  have	  positive	  efficiency	  effects…	   there	   is	   no	   need	   for	   European	   regional	   policy	   to	   deal	  with	   intra-­‐national	  regional	  inequalities	  (P.	  Martin,	  2005,	  pp.	  99-­‐100,	  107).	  	  And	  similarly,	  according	  to	  an	  internal	  UK	  Treasury	  paper:	  	   Theory	  and	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  allowing	  regional	  concentration	  of	  economic	  activity	  will	  increase	  national	  growth.	  As	  long	  as	  economies	  of	  scale,	  knowledge	  spillovers	   and	   a	   local	   pool	   of	   skilled	   labour	   result	   in	   productivity	   gains	   that	  outweigh	   congestion	   costs,	   the	   economy	   will	   benefit	   from	   agglomeration…	  
policies	   that	  aim	   to	   spread	  growth	  amongst	   regions	  are	   running	  counter	   to	   the	  
natural	   growth	   process	   and	   are	   difficult	   to	   justify	   on	   efficiency	   grounds,	   unless	  
significant	  congestion	  costs	  exist”	  (HM.	  Treasury,	  2006,	  emphasis	  added)	  	  	  A	   further	   acceptance	   of	   this	   view	   is	   evident	   in	   the	   more	   recent	   UK	  Government	   paper	   on	   Understanding	   Local	   Growth,	   which	   develops	   its	  arguments	  firmly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  NEG	  theory:	  	  	   This	   new	   understanding	   [the	   New	   Economic	   Geography]	   of	   how	   economics	  works	   across	   space	   also	   alters	   the	   expected	   equilibrium.	   As	   both	   people	   and	  firms	  move	  to	  areas	  of	  high	  productivity	  there	  will	  be	  no	  simple	  convergence	  of	  productivity	  levels.	  Even	  with	  fully	  functioning	  markets,	  there	  can	  be	  an	  uneven	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   In	   the	   UK,	   both	   NEG	   and	  NUE	  models	   have	   permeated	   policy	   thinking	   in	   several	  major	  Government	  Departments,	   including	   the	  Treasury,	   the	  Department	   for	  Business,	   Innovation	  and	  Skills,	  and	  the	  Department	  for	  Communities	  and	  Local	  Government.	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distribution	   of	   economic	   performance,	   and	   persistent	   differences	   that	   are	   not	  necessarily	   due	   to	   market	   failure	   (Department	   of	   Business,	   Innovation	   and	  Skills,	  2010,	  p.	  23.)	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  NEG	  type	  thinking	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  such	  views	  can	  be	   highly	   persuasive,	   and	   difficult	   to	   contest.	   	   NEG	   models	   have	   a	  mathematical	  exactitude	  that	  impresses	  policy-­‐makers,	  as	  does	  their	  appeal	  to	  efficient	   equilibrium	  outcomes,	   and	   to	  market	   failures	  as	   the	  main	   rationale	  for	   policy	   intervention.	   This	   same	   mathematical	   formalism	   also	   differs	  sharply,	   of	   course,	   from	   the	   less	   quantitative,	   often	   more	   narrative	   based	  approaches	   that	   are	   frequently	   found	   in	   regional	   studies	   and	   economic	  geography.	   	   The	   empirical	   evidence	   on	   the	   ‘trade-­‐off’,	   however,	   is	   far	   from	  unequivocal.	   For	   example,	   whilst	   some	   studies	   claim	   to	   find	   a	   positive	  relationship	  between	  national	  growth	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  spatial	  agglomeration	  or	   regional	   inequality	   (Dall’erba	   and	  Hewings	   2003;	   P.	  Martin	   2005;	   Crozet	  and	  Koenig	  2007),	  others	  do	  not	  (Sbergami	  2002;	  Bosker	  2007;	  Martin,	  2008;	  Gardiner	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  To	  add	  to	  this	  ambiguity,	  Krugman	  himself	  (2009)	  has	  recently	   voiced	   some	   doubt	   as	   to	   whether	   increasing	   returns	   to	   spatial	  agglomeration	  are	  as	  important	  as	  they	  once	  were:	  	   there’s	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  world	  economy	  has,	  over	  time,	  actually	  become	   less	   characterised	   by	   the	   kinds	   of	   increasing	   returns	   effects	  emphasized	   by	   new	   trade	   theory	   and	   new	   geography.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  geography,	  in	  fact,	  the	  peak	  impact	  of	  increasing	  returns	  occurred	  long	  before	  the	  theorists	  arrived	  on	  the	  scene	  (p.569).	  	  Similar	  sentiments	  have	  been	  voiced	  by	  others	  (for	  example,	  McCann	  and	  Acs,	  2011).	  	  What	  of	  NUE	  theory?	  	  In	  these	  models,	  the	  focus	  is	  very	  much	  on	  the	  benefits	  and	  advantages	  that	  accrue	  from	  the	  density	  of	  activity	  and	  population	  within	  cities:	   density	   is	   alleged	   to	   increase	   interaction,	   spillovers,	   market	  opportunities,	   productivity	   and	   wages.	   	   Particular	   emphasis	   is	   put	   on	   the	  agglomeration	  of	  human	  capital:	  a	  city’s	  success	  depends	  on	  having	  a	  highly	  skilled	   and	   well	   educated	   workforce,	   and	   the	   more	   successful	   is	   a	   city	   (in	  terms	  of	  high	  wages,	  high	  productivity	  and	  so	  on)	  the	  more	  it	  will	  attract	  such	  workers	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Glaeser	  and	  Saiz,	  2004;	  also	  Moretti,	  2013).	  There	  is	   no	   doubt	   that	   skilled,	   educated	   and	   enterprising	   workers	   are	   drawn	   to	  cities;	  after	  all	   job	  opportunities,	  wages	  and	  market	  openings	  are	  all	  greater	  there.	   	   What	   is	   at	   issue	   is	   just	   how	   big	   cities	   have	   to	   be	   to	   gain	   from	   this	  agglomeration	   and	   the	   externalities	   it	   produces:	   do	   such	   positive	   effects	  necessarily	  continue	  to	  increase	  with	  increases	  in	  city	  size?	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What	   is	   curious	   about	   much	   NUE	   is	   that	   cities	   are	   treated	   almost	   as	   ‘free-­‐floating	   islands’,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   their	   precise	   location	   is	   of	   secondary	  importance.	  A	  highly	  successful	  city	  –	  such	  as	  Boston	  in	  the	  US,	  or	  Cambridge	  in	  the	  UK	  –	  could	  in	  effect	  be	  anywhere	  within	  their	  respective	  countries.	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  once	  the	  ‘individual’	  effects	  (skill,	  occupation	  and	  the	  like)	  of	  workers	   are	   ‘controlled’	   for,	   ‘place’	   effects	   are	   negligible	   and	   real	   spatial	  economic	   disparities	   (in	   real	   wages	   for	   example)	   all	   but	   disappear.	   	   Thus	  according	  to	  one	  such	  analysis:	  	   our	   general	   finding	   is	   that	   most	   of	   the	   observed	   regional	   inequality	   in	  average	   wage	   in	   Britain	   is	   explained	   by	   ‘sorting’	   or	   ‘people’	   rather	   than	  ‘places’.	  Our	  preferred	  estimates,	  which	   include	  the	   individual	   fixed	  effects,	  suggest	   that	   the	   contribution	   of	   individual	   characteristics	   to	   variation	   in	  wages	   is	   between	   100	   to	   850	   times	   larger	   than	   the	   contribution	   of	   area	  effects	  (Gibbons	  et	  al,	  2011).	  	  Now	  this	  study	  and	  others	  like	  it	  have	  used	  some	  sophisticated	  techniques	  –	  such	   as	   different	   variance	   decomposition	  measures	   and	   fixed	   effects	   cross-­‐section	   econometric	  models	   –	   to	   arrive	   at	   this	   type	   of	   conclusion.	   	   	   Are	  we	  then	   to	   believe	   that	   place	   actually	   does	   play	   no	   significant	   role,	   that	   the	  agglomeration	   of	   skilled	   and	   high	   wage	   workers	   in	   particular	   regions	   and	  cities	   	   -­‐	   such	  as	   the	  London-­‐South	  East	   region	   in	   the	  UK	  –	   is	  entirely	  due	   to	  spatial	  ‘sorting’	  behaviour	  by	  rational	  workers?	  	  If	  so,	  then,	  again,	  there	  would	  appear	   to	   be	   little	   grounds	   for	   spatial	   or	   place-­‐based	   policies	   aimed	   at	  securing	   a	   more	   spatially	   balanced	   economy,	   only	   general,	   economy-­‐wide	  people-­‐based	  policies	   (for	  example,	   to	   raise	   the	  education	  and	  skill	   levels	  of	  individuals)	  or	  measures	  that	  support	  small	  firms	  everywhere.	  If	  there	  a	  case	  for	  place-­‐based	  policies	  under	   this	  view,	   it	   is	   for	   interventions	   that	  promote	  the	  benefits	  and	  dampen	  down	  any	  disadvantages	  of	  agglomeration	  (Nathan	  and	   Overman,	   2013).	   Planning	   restrictions,	   in	   particular,	   are	   singled	   out	   as	  prime	  examples	  of	  barriers	  to	  the	   ‘spatial	  sorting’	  (of	  workers)	  because	  they	  interfere	   with	   the	   workings	   of	   city	   land	   and	   housing	   markets	   (Cheshire,	  Nathan	   and	  Overman,	   2014).	   	   This	   has	   become	   a	   common	   line	   of	   argument	  with	   respect	   to	   London	   and	   the	   South	   East	   of	   the	   UK,	   where,	   it	   is	   clamed,	  restrictive	   planning	   regulations	   and	   ‘green	   belt’	   zoning	   have	   contributed	   to	  the	   shortage	   of	   housing	   and	   the	   high	   house	   prices	   in	   these	   areas,	   which	   in	  turn	  are	  viewed	  as	  threats	  to	  the	  continued	  economic	  expansion	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	   country.	   	   There	   is	   thus	   a	   strong	   case,	   according	   to	   such	   authors,	   for	  removing	  and	  dismantling	  planning	   frameworks.	   Some	  NUE	  exponents	  even	  argue	  for	  deliberately	  increasing	  population	  densities	  in	  cities	  (Glaeser	  in	  The	  
Atlantic,	  2011)	  –	  ‘building	  up	  is	  better	  than	  building	  out’.	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But	  can	  workers’	  skills	  and	  productivity	  be	  separated	  from	  their	  place	  of	  work	  and	  residence	  so	  easily?	  	  The	  skill	  base	  of	  a	  region	  or	  city	  will	  reflect	  its	  past	  economic	   development	   path,	   its	   economic	   structures	   and	   labour	   processes.	  And	   those	   inherited	  skills	  and	  practices	  may	  well	   influence	   future	  skills	  and	  practices.	   	   People	  obviously	   ‘make’	  places;	  but	  places	   also	   ‘shape’	  people	  by	  virtue	   of	   the	   economic	   structures,	   employment	   opportunities,	   knowledge	  networks,	  and	  educational	  and	  other	  public	  and	  social	   institutions	   that	  exist	  in	   given	   localities.	   The	   passing	   on	   of	   skills,	   learning,	   and	   spillovers	   of	  knowledge	  amongst	  workers	  in	  a	  local	   labour	  market	  are	  surely	  some	  of	  the	  locally-­‐based	  emergent	  processes	   that	   characterize	  spatial	  agglomeration.	   	  A	  high-­‐skill	  and	  dynamic	  local	  economy	  will	  tend	  to	  produce	  the	  spillovers	  and	  institutional	   and	   cultural	   forms	   that	   reinforce	   that	   locality’s	   high-­‐skill	  environment;	   and	   conversely	   in	   a	   low-­‐skill	   less-­‐prosperous	   local	   economy.	  Interestingly,	   Lösch	   himself	   stressed	   the	   close	   interrelationships	   between	  people,	  production	  and	  place	  (see	  Figure	  3).	  To	  argue	  that	  place	  imparts	  little	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  The	  Interrelationships	  between	  People,	  Place	  and	  Production	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institutions	   and	   infrastructures	   -­‐	   key	   components	   of	   what	   he	   calls	   locally-­
specific	   ‘fundamentals’	   –	   can	   indeed	   be	   a	   valid	   focus	   of	   regional	   and	   urban	  policy.	   	  And	  some	  urban	  economists	  such	  as	  Moretti	   (2013)	  also	  seem	  to	  be	  coming	  round	  to	  a	  similar	  view	  that	  the	  success	  of	  a	  city	  has	  to	  do	  with	  place-­‐based	  attributes	  as	  much	  as	  with	  human	  capital	  alone.	  	  	  All	   this	   is	   certainly	   not	   meant	   to	   deny	   that	   the	   agglomeration	   of	   economic	  activity	   in	   core	   regions	   or	   principal	   cities	   confers	   real	   and	   significant	  economic	  advantages	  –	  of	  course	  it	  does;	  	  nor	  to	  dispute	  the	  key	  role	  of	  major	  city-­‐regions	  in	  today’s	  globalizing	  world	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Scott	  2001;	  Florida	  2008).	  	  The	  issue,	  rather,	  is	  first,	  whether	  NEG	  and	  NUE	  models	  offer	  a	  full	  and	  credible	  explanation	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  (see	  Martin,	  1999,	  2013;	  Garretsen	  and	   Martin,	   2010),	   second,	   whether	   there	   are	   limits	   to	   the	   benefits	   of	  agglomeration,	   third,	   whether	   promoting	   larger	   urban	   agglomerations	   in	  lagging	   regions,	   like	   northern	   Britain,	   is	   the	   best	   or	   only	  way	   of	   promoting	  growth	   there,	   and	   fourth	   whether	   in	   fact	   there	   really	   is	   a	   spatial	   equity-­‐national	  efficiency	  trade-­‐off.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  productivity	  tends	  to	  be	  higher	  in	  urban	  agglomerations,	  though	   the	   estimates	   of	   how	  much	   an	   increase	   in	   local	   agglomeration	   –	   or	  ‘economic	  mass’	  -­‐	  raises	  labour	  productivity	  levels	  vary	  widely.	  For	  example,	  	  	  it	   has	   been	   estimated	   that	   a	   doubling	   of	   local	   density	   (population	   or	  employment)	   raises	  productivity	  by	  between	  about	  2-­‐5	  percent	   for	   the	  USA	  and	   similarly	   for	   Europe	   (Ciccone,	   2002;	   Rappaport,	   2007;	   Abel,	   Dey	   and	  Gabe,	  2011).	  These	  seem	  modest	  effects	  indeed.	   	   	  Such	  analyses,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  are	  typically	  static,	  cross	  sectional	   in	  nature,	  rather	  than	  dynamic	  and	  developmental.	   And	   results	  may	   vary	   because	   of	   the	   different	   spatial	   scales	  used	   to	   measure	   agglomeration.	   Yet	   a	   further	   issue	   is	   whether	   the	   alleged	  relationship	   varies	   with	   the	   type	   of	   spatial	   agglomeration,	   for	   example,	  whether	  economically	  specialized	  or	  diversified.	  	  Further,	  there	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  congestion	  and	  environmental	  costs,	  and	  how	  far	  these	  are	  socialized.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  is	  ample	  evidence,	  across	  Europe	  and	  the	  USA,	  that	  the	  largest	   cities	   are	   not	   necessarily	   the	   fastest	   growing	   in	   terms	   of	   output	   or	  employment.	  	  In	  the	  UK,	  it	  has	  been	  the	  smaller	  cities	  –	  especially	  those	  in	  the	  south	  of	  the	  country	  -­‐	  that	  have	  dominated	  the	  growth	  league	  table	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  (Figure	  4;	  see	  Martin,	  Tyler	  and	  Gardiner,	  2014).	  	  London	  aside,	   the	   other	   large	   cities	   and	   conurbations	   of	   Birmingham,	   Sheffield,	  Manchester,	   Liverpool	   and	   Newcastle,	   all	   in	   the	   North,	   have	   lagged	   well	  behind	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  both	  output	  and	  employment	  (Figures	  4	  and	  5).	  	  The	  spatial	  economists	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  finding	  is	  not	  at	  all	  inconsistent	  with	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urban	  economics	  models,	  and	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  criticize	  the	  latter.	  Yet,	  at	  the	  same	   time,	   these	   same	  authors	   claim	   that	   the	  poor	  performance	  of	   the	  UK’s	  northern	  cities	  is	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  cities	  are	  not	  large	  enough	  (Overman	  and	  Rice,	  2008).	  They	  argue	  that	  these	  cities	  are	  smaller	  than	  one	  would	  predict	   from	  Zipf’s	   Law.	  The	  presumption	   is	   that	   if	   they	  were	   larger,	  they	   would	   enjoy	   greater	   increasing	   returns	   effects	   and	   hence	   higher	  productivity	   and	   higher	   wages.	   	   But	   as	   Paul	   Krugman	   (1996)	   himself	   has	  cautioned,	  Zipf’s	  Law	  does	  not	  necessarily	  fit	  an	  economy	  where	  the	  primary	  city	  is	  also	  the	  national	  capital,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  London	  in	  the	  UK:	  	  	  
	  many	   countries,	   for	   example,	   France	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   have	   a	   single	  ‘primate	  city’	  that	  is	  much	  larger	  than	  a	  line	  drawn	  through	  the	  distribution	  of	  other	  cities	  would	  lead	  you	  to	  expect.	  These	  primate	  cities	  are	  typically	  political	  capitals:	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   imagine	   that	   they	  are	  essentially	  different	   creatures	   from	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  urban	  system	  (1996,	  p.	  41,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  A	  similar	  point	  is	  made	  by	  Gabaix	  (1999),	  who	  argues	  that:	  	  	  In	  most	  countries	  Zipf	  plots	  usually	  present	  an	  outlier,	  the	  capital,	  which	  has	  a	  bigger	  size	  than	  Zipf’s	  law	  would	  warrant.	  There	  is	  nothing	  surprising	  there	  because	  the	  capital	  is	  a	  peculiar	  object,	  driven	  by	  unique	  political	  forces	  (op	  cit,	  p.756,	  emphasis	  added).	  
	  The	   fact	   of	   the	  matter	   is	   that	   the	   evidence	   for	   Zipf’s	   law	   is	  weak	   in	   general	  (Soo,	  2005).	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  UK,	  London	  is	  indeed	  a	  very	  ‘different	  creature’	  from	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  country’s	  urban	  system,	  and	   its	  economy	   is	  most	  certainly	  partly	  driven	  by	  unique	  political	  forces.	  	  London	  is	  the	  location	  of	  what	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	   centralized	  national	  political	   and	   financial	   systems	   to	  be	   found	  among	  OECD	   countries.	   	   It	   has	   also	   been	   the	   recipient	   –	   and	   continues	   to	   be	   the	  beneficiary	   -­‐	   of	   vast	   sums	   of	   public	   expenditures	   and	   monies,	   on	  infrastructure,	   transport,	   education,	   health	   services,	   and	   major	   cultural	  institutions	  	  (estimated	  at	  £80billion	  a	  year	  by	  Oxford	  Economics,	  2007),	  all	  of	  which	  help	   sustain	   its	   growth	  and	   the	   attraction	   to	   it	   of	  workers,	   firms	  and	  private	   sector	   resources.	   To	   argue	   that	   the	   agglomeration	   of	   activity	   in	  London	  is	  somehow	  	  ‘market-­‐driven’	  is	  quite	  misleading:	  London’s	  economy	  is	  substantially	  underwritten	  by	  the	  state,	  on	  a	  per	  capita	  basis	  no	  less	  than,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  more	  than,	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  UK.	  	  	  While	  it	  might	  be	  correct	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  UK’s	  major	  second-­‐tier	  cities	  such	  as	   Manchester,	   Birmingham,	   Liverpool,	   Sheffield	   and	   Newcastle	   should	   be	  larger	   agglomerations,	   size	   itself	   is	   no	   guarantor	   of	   success.	   	   Some	   of	   the	  spatial	  economists,	  drawing	  again	  on	  Zipf’s	  law,	  even	  suggest	  that	  London	  is	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Figure	  4:	  Large	  Northern	  Cities	  Have	  Lagged	  Behind	  -­	  Output	  and	  Employment	  
Growth	  in	  63	  British	  Cities,	  1981-­2011	  (Average	  Annual	  Growth	  Rates),	  
Classified	  into	  South	  and	  North	  
Note:	  Cities	  are	  those	  with	  populations	  of	  125,000	  or	  more	  in	  2011,	  and	  are	  the	  Primary	  Urban	  Areas	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  Centre	  for	  Cities.	  	  GVA	  is	  in	  2006	  prices.	  	  ‘South’	  is	  defined	  as	  comprising	  London,	  the	  South	  East,	  East	  of	  England,	  South	  West	  and	  East	  Midlands	  regions;	  ‘North’	  comprises	  the	  East	  Midlands,	  Wales,	  Yorkshire-­‐Humberside.	  North	  West,	  North	  East	  and	  Scotland.	  
Source:	  Martin,	  Tyler	  and	  Gardiner	  (2014)	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Divergent	  Cities	  –	  Cumulative	  Differential	  Output	  Growth	  in	  Largest	  
and	  Fastest	  Growing	  Cities,	  1981-­2011	  
Cumulated	  Differences	  between	  City	  and	  National	  (GB)	  Annual	  



















Note:	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  itself	   is	   too	   small	  and,	   further,	   that	   if	   the	   British	   economy	   is	   to	   be	   spatially	  balanced,	   policy	   should	   only	   really	   focus	   on	   promoting	   just	   one	   other	   large	  metro-­‐agglomeration	   in	   addition	   to	   London,	   a	   sort	   of	   northern	   ‘mega-­‐city-­‐region’	   (connecting	   up	   Liverpool,	   Manchester,	   Leeds	   and	   Sheffield).	   In	  contrast,	  the	  recent	  reports	  of	  the	  City	  Growth	  Commission	  (2014a,	  b,	  c)	  take	  a	  more	  poly-­‐centric	  view,	  and	  identify	  15	  cities	  around	  the	  UK	  that	  should	  be	  the	   economic	   hubs	   of	   major	   city-­‐regions.	   The	   fact	   is	   that	   further	  agglomeration	  need	  not	  necessarily	  be	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  economic	  success	  of	  northern	  cities;	  bigger	  is	  not	  necessarily	  better.	   	  There	  may	  well	  be	  limits	  to	  agglomeration;	   and	   urban	   agglomeration	   economies	   ebb	   and	   flow,	   perhaps	  even	  have	   ‘life	  cycles’	   (Potter	  and	  Watts,	  2011).	  The	  economic	  revival	  of	   the	  UK’s	  northern	  cities	  may	  have	  as	  much,	  if	  not	  more,	  to	  do	  with	  re-­‐orientating	  their	  economies,	  with	  substantially	   improving	  their	   infrastructures,	  with	  up-­‐skilling	  their	  human	  capital,	  with	  improving	  their	  interconnectivity,	  and	  with	  granting	   them	  much	  greater	   financial	  and	  political	  autonomy,	   than	  with	  size	  
per	  se.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  increasing	  agglomeration	  of	  economic	  activity	  in	  London	  and	  the	  South	  East	  pushes	  up	  wage	  costs,	   land	  and	  office	  rents,	  and	  house	  prices	  there.	   	  According	   to	  a	  recent	  survey	  of	  global	  cities,	  London	  has	  become	  the	  most	   expensive	   such	   city	   in	   the	   world	   in	   which	   to	   live	   and	   work	   (Savills,	  2014).	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  house	  price	  gap	  between	  London	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  has	  widened	  dramatically	  over	   the	  past	  decade	  and	  a	  half,	   to	  a	   level	  unprecedented	  in	  modern	  history	  (Figure	  6).	  Average	  house	  prices	  in	  London	  are	   almost	   two	   and	   a	   half	   times	   the	   national	   average,	   and	  more	   than	   three	  times	  those	  in	  the	  North.	  	  While	  the	  high	  house	  prices	  in	  London	  are,	  without	  question,	  the	  result	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  supply	  relative	  to	  demand,	  a	  not	  insignificant	  portion	  of	  that	  demand	  has	  itself	  been	  driven	  by	  another	  aspect	  of	  unbalanced	  growth,	  namely	  the	  extraordinary	  salaries	  and	  bonuses	  paid	  to	  those	  working	  in	  London’s	  financial	  and	  professional	  sectors.	  	  In	  addition,	  numerous	  high	  net	  worth	   overseas	   investors,	   including	   some	   overseas	   sovereign	  wealth	   funds,	  have	  been	  keen	  to	  own	  and	  benefit	  from	  a	  slice	  of	  the	  capital’s	  real	  estate.	  	  For	  many	  such	  investors,	  property	  in	  London	  is	  a	  safe	  hedge	  in	  a	  turbulent	  global	  financial	  system.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  London	  has	  been	  the	  epicenter	  of	  the	  last	   three	   house	   price	   booms,	   in	   the	   late-­‐1970s,	   late-­‐1980s	   and	   the	   2000s,	  which	  have	  then	  spread	  outwards	  across	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  In	  this	  sense,	  London	   has	   been	   a	   recurring	   source	   of	   inflationary	   pressure,	   itself	   another	  aspect	  of	  spatial	  economic	  imbalance.	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I	   am	   certainly	   not	   arguing	   that	   the	   new	   spatial	   economics	   offers	   no	   useful	  insight	   into	   the	   processes	   and	   advantages	   of	   spatial	   agglomeration.	   	   To	   the	  contrary,	   it	   has	   greatly	   advanced	   our	   understanding	   of	   that	   phenomenon.	  Some	  of	   the	  results	   from	  these	  models	  are	  powerful	  and	   instructive.	  But	  the	  new	  spatial	  economics	  leads	  too	  readily	  to	  the	  view	  that	  spatial	  agglomeration	  is	  the	  only	  or	  main	  game	  in	  town,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  almost	  everywhere	  a	  nationally	  efficient,	  market-­‐driven	  equilibrium	  outcome.	  	  It	  thus	  also	  leads	  all	  too	  easily	  to	  an	  opposition	  –	  or	  at	  least	  a	  very	  suspicious	  attitude	  	  -­‐	  to	  place-­‐based	  policy	  intervention,	  unless	  the	  focus	  of	  that	  policy	  is	  to	  remove	  what	  are	  regarded	  as	  impediments	   to	   the	   free	   functioning	   of	   markets	   (especially	   city	   land	   and	  housing	   markets).	   	   	   It	   is	   not	   surprising,	   therefore,	   that	   some	   critics	   have	  attacked	   the	   obsession	   with	   agglomeration,	   city	   size	   and	   deregulation	   as	  ‘urban	   boosterism’	   in	   all	   but	   name	   (Haughton,	   Deas	   and	   Hinkcs,	   2014),	   a	  charge	  strongly	  rejected	  by	  the	  spatial	  economists	  (Overman,	  2014).	  	  	  I	  tend	  to	  side	   with	   the	   critics.	   The	   case	   for	  making	   London	   ever	   larger,	   while	   at	   the	  same	  time	  promoting	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  northern	  ‘mega-­‐city’	  equivalent,	  is	  far	  from	   proven.	   Furthermore,	   I	   would	   raise	   other	   concerns.	   Neither	   NEG	   nor	  NUE	  have	  much	  to	  say	  about	  how	  and	  why	  cities	  and	  regions	  differ	  in	  their	  	  
	  	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  	  Regional	  House	  Price	  Gaps	  and	  the	  London	  Phenomenon:	  
Average	  House	  prices,	  1973(4)-­2014(2)	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adaptability	   to	   economic	   change	   -­‐	   how	   they	   evolve	   over	   time;	   and	   they	   also	  largely	   ignore	   or	   relegate	   the	   role	   of	   institutional	   and	   political	   structures	   in	  shaping	  spatial	  economic	  development	  (other	  than	  including	  some	  simplistic	  indicators,	   	   dummy	   variables	   or	   ‘fixed	   effects’	   to	   try	   to	   capture	   their	  influence).	  	  While	  NEG	  and	  NNUE	  may	  provide	  some	  valuable	  insights	  into	  the	  spatial	   structure	   of	   the	   economy,	   these	   frameworks	   are	   incomplete	   as	  explanations,	   and	   provide	   only	   a	   partial	   guide	   for	   correcting	   major	   spatial	  imbalances.	   	   The	   undue	   influence	   exerted	   by	   these	   approaches	   on	   much	  official	  policy	  thinking	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  elsewhere	  can	  thus	  be	  questioned.	  	  	  4.	  The	  Limitations	  of	  Existing	  Theory,	  II:	  Regional	  Studies	  -­‐A	  Surfeit	  of	  Concepts	  in	  Need	  of	  Synthesis?	  	  But	  if	  the	  new	  spatial	  economics	  has	  limitations,	  what	  do	  regional	  studies	  and	  economic	   geography	   have	   to	   say?	   A	   decade	   and	   a	   half	   ago,	   Ann	   Markusen	  (1999)	   seriously	   questioned	   whether	   regional	   studies	   had	   much	   relevance,	  either	   for	   our	   understanding	   of	   regional	   problems	   or	   for	   influencing	   policy	  making.	  	  Her	  critique	  –	  that	  regional	  studies	  was	  littered	  with	  fuzzy	  concepts,	  that	  it	  lacked	  empirical	  depth,	  and	  that	  it	  suffered	  from	  what	  she	  called	  ‘policy	  distance’	   –	   elicited	   a	   sharp	   rebuke	   from	   among	   certain	   regional	   studies	  scholars	  and	  economic	  geographers	  (see	  Regional	  Studies,	  2003).	  	  Perhaps	  her	  critique	  was	  exaggerated,	  though	  I	  believe	  it	  was	  not	  far	  off	  the	  mark.	  	  	  	  More	   recently,	   Hadjimichalis	   and	   Hudson	   (2014)	   have	   voiced	   different	  concerns,	  in	  this	  case	  that	  the	  European	  crisis	  has	  exposed	  major	  weaknesses	  not	   just	   in	   NEG	   type	   theory	   but	   also	   in	   regional	   studies	   and	   economic	  geography.	   	  Their	  critique	   is	   that	  neither	  body	  of	  work	  says	  much	  about	  the	  crisis	   or	   about	   the	   process	   of	   combined	   and	   uneven	   development.	   	   I	   have	  considerable	  sympathy	  with	  this	  argument.	   	  Although	  it	   is	  perhaps	  tempting	  to	   view	   Europe’s	   crisis	   as	   an	   unexpected	   shock,	   albeit	   one	   from	  which	   the	  recovery	   is	   slow,	   it	   can	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   manifestation	   of	   deeper-­‐seated	  systemic	   problems	   associated	   with	   the	   interaction	   between	   Europe’s	  particular	   (and	  asymmetric)	   form	  of	  monetary	  union	  and	   its	   geographies	  of	  uneven	   development	   (see	   Martin,	   2001;	   Fingleton,	   Garretsen	   and	   Martin,	  2015).11	   	  Not	  only	  does	  spatially	  unbalanced	  growth	  between	  and	  within	  the	  member	   states	   of	   the	   Eurozone	   pose	   problems	   for	   a	   monetary	   union	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  In	  fact	  not	  dissimilar	  concerns	  were	  raised	  some	  forty	  years	  ago	  by	  Magnifico	  (1973).	  He	  queried	   whether	   the	   European	   nations	  met	   the	   criteria	   necessary	   for	   successful	   monetary	  union,	   in	   part	   because	   of	   regional	   disparities	   in	   economic	   performance	   and	   inflation	  proneness	  across	  member	  states.	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lacks	  accompanying	  fiscal	  union,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  (Martin,	  2001),	  the	   restrictions	   associated	   with	   a	   common	   currency	   in	   turn	   have	   major	  implications	   for	   the	   process	   of	   uneven	   regional	   development	   in	   and	   among	  the	  member	  countries.	   	  Time	  was	  when	  economic	  geographers	  and	  regional	  theorists	  talked	  seriously	  about	  ‘combined	  and	  uneven	  regional	  development’	  and	  sought	   to	   theorise	  and	  critically	   interrogate	   this	  process	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  fundamental	  mechanisms	  and	  structures	  that	  underpin	  capitalist	  growth.	  But	  this	  paradigm	  has	  all	  but	  disappeared	  from	  current	  thinking.12	  	  Why	  is	  this?	  	  Hadjimichalis	  and	  Hudson	  attribute	  this	  disappearance	  largely	  to	  an	  academic	  obsession	  within	   regional	   studies	  with	   the	   study	   of	   ‘successful’	   regions	   and	  localities.	   	   There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   much	   of	   regional	   studies	   and	   economic	  geography	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  or	  so	  has	  focused	  on	  success	  stories,	  on	  high-­‐tech	   regions	  and	  clusters,	  on	  dynamic	   regional	   innovation	  systems	  and	  networks,	  on	  so-­‐called	  ‘creative’	  cities,	  on	  examples	  of	  ‘smart’	  governance	  and	  leadership,	  and	   the	   like.	   	  By	  comparison,	   less	  attention	  has	  been	  directed	   to	  problem	  regions	  and	  cities,	  to	  areas	  that	  have	  lost	  their	  former	  dynamism	  or	  economic	   roles,	   or	   to	   why	   such	   places	   become	   locked	   into	   inferior	   growth	  paths,	  how	  they	  might	  be	  revived	  on	  a	  new	  developmental	  path,	  and	  how	  far	  and	  in	  what	  ways	  the	  fortunes	  of	  regions	  is	  linked	  to	  patterns	  of	  dependency	  and	  interaction.	  	  	  	  Perhaps	  the	  overwhelming	  emphasis	  on	  successful	  regions	  is	  understandable:	  these	  are	  obviously	  much	  more	  exciting	  to	  study	  than	  depressed	  and	  lagging	  regions,	   and	   prominent	   personal	   academic	   careers	   and	   even	   global	   public	  acclaim	   can	  more	   easily	   be	   forged	   by	   championing	   success	   stories	   (witness	  	  Michael	   Porter’s	   promotion	   of	   ‘clusters’	   and	   Richard	   Florida’s	   credo	   of	  ‘creative’	   classes	   and	   cities).13	   Given	   that	  much	  of	   the	  period	   from	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	   to	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   crisis	   in	   2007	   was	   one	   of	   growth	   and	   rapid	  technological	   change,	   regional	   studies	   naturally	   focused	   on	   those	   regions,	  cities	  and	  clusters	  and	  industries	  that	  appeared	  to	  be	  leading	  this	  new	  phase	  of	  expansion.	  	  Further,	  not	  only	  has	  the	  focus	  been	  on	  success	  stories,	  the	  urge	  to	   ‘read	  off’	  policy	   lessons	   from	   these	   stories	  has	  proved	   irresistible:	   if	   only	  depressed,	  economically	  lagging	  regions	  and	  cities	  could	  replicate	  some	  of	  the	  features	   found	   in	   successful	   regions	   and	   cities	   –	   develop	   clusters,	   build	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Among	  the	  relatively	  few	  remaining	  stalwart	  torch	  bearers,	  David	  Harvey	  of	  course	  stands	  out	  (eg	  Harvey,	  2006).	  
13	  Both	  Porter	  and	  Florida	  have	  become	  something	  of	  global	  ‘policy	  celebrities’,	  consulted	  by	  governments	   around	   the	   world	   eager	   to	   find	   the	   ‘magic	   bullet’	   of	   local,	   city	   and	   regional	  economic	  success,	  in	  the	  first	  case	  by	  promoting	  clusters,	  in	  the	  second	  by	  attracting	  so-­‐called	  ‘creative’	  people	  and	  industries.	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regional	   innovation	   system,	   attract	   the	   creative	   classes,	   pursue	   ‘smart	  specialization’,	  or	  secure	  good	  local	  leadership	  and	  governance,	  for	  example	  –	  then	  their	  economies	  would	  be	  revived.	  	  	  	  What	  we	  seem	  to	  do	   in	  regional	  studies	  and	  economic	  geography	   is	   to	   lurch	  from	  one	  concept	  –	  dare	  one	  say,	  fad	  –	  to	  another.	  	  One	  moment	  it	  is	  regional	  innovation	  systems,	  at	  another	  learning	  regions,	  at	  yet	  another	  clusters,	  then	  supply	   chains,	   more	   recently	   smart	   specialization,	   global	   production	  networks,	   and	   regional	   resilience,	   and	   so	   on.	   	   Likewise,	   a	   succession	   of	  theoretical	  perspectives	  has	  appeared	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades,	   including	  regulationist,	   Schumpeterian,	   institutional,	   network-­‐orientated,	   relational,	  and	  evolutionary.	  I	  am	  as	  guilty	  as	  anyone	  in	  contributing	  to	  this	  burgeoning	  array	  of	  (partial)	  concepts	  and	  paradigms.	  It	  would	  be	  quite	  wrong	  to	  suggest	  that	  none	  of	  these	  ideas	  has	  had	  no	  impact	  on	  policy.	  The	  notions	  of	  clusters,	  creative	   cities,	   and	   more	   recently,	   smart	   specialization	   are	   three	   obvious	  examples	  that	  have	  resonated	  with	  policy-­‐makers.	  	  Clusters	  in	  particular	  have	  become	  widely	   regarded	  as	   an	   absolutely	   essential	   component,	   the	   sine	  qua	  
non,	  of	  the	  regional	  policy	  tool	  kit.	  	  Yet,	  although	  a	  highly	  geographical	  notion,	  it	  was	  the	  business	  economist	  Michael	  Porter	  who,	  by	  cleverly	  linking	  clusters	  explicitly	  with	   firm	   competitiveness,	   developed	   and	  promoted	   this	   idea	   and	  made	   it	   so	   attractive	   to	   the	   policy-­‐making	   community	   (Huggins	   and	   Izushi,	  2011).	  To	  be	  sure,	  regional	  studies	  scholars	  and	  economic	  geographers	  have	  enthusiastically	  expanded	  on	  and	  enriched	  Porter’s	  work	  in	  various	  ways,	  and	  we	  now	  know	  much	  more	  about	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  clusters,	  about	  their	  various	  localisation	  economies,	  their	  role	  in	  knowledge	  production	  and	  so	  on.	  However,	   the	   alleged	   advantages	   of	   clusters	   (that	   they	   promote	   greater	  innovation,	   productivity	   and	   growth)	   have	   not	   gone	   uncontested	   (for	  example,	   Cooke,	   Asheim	   and	  Martin,	   2006;	  Martin	   and	   Sunley,	   2003,	   2011;	  Duranton,	   2011),	   and	   we	   still	   know	   relatively	   little	   about	   how	   clusters	  actually	  emerge	  or	  how	  they	  evolve	  and	  adapt	  over	  time	  (Martin	  and	  Sunley,	  2011b).	   Further,	   few	   studies	   demonstrate	   just	   how	   far,	   and	   under	   what	  circumstances,	   they	   act	   as	   engines	   of	   wider	   regional	   growth	   and	   spatial	  economic	   development	   (Martin	   and	   Sunley,	   2011).	   	   And	   perhaps	   most	  problematically,	   few	   clusters	   studies	   link	   them	   into	   the	   wider,	   global	  economic	   systems	   in	   which	   cluster	   firms	   compete	   and	   interact	   with	   one	  another.	   While	   clusters	   can,	   under	   specific	   circumstances,	   form	   a	   valuable	  part	   of	   a	   regional	   or	   urban	   development	   strategy,	   in	   general	   the	   case	   for	  cluster	   policies	   remains	   theoretically	   ambiguous	   and	   empirically	   equivocal	  (Duranton,	  Martin,	  P.	   and	  Mayer,	  2010;	  Duranton,	  2011;	  Asheim,	  Cooke	  and	  Martin,	  2006;	  Martin	  and	  Sunley,	  2011c).	  	  Even	  if	  they	  are	  necessary	  elements	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of	  a	  strategy	  for	  spatially	  rebalancing	  a	  national	  economy	  like	  that	  of	  the	  UK,	  of	  themselves	  they	  are	  far	  from	  sufficient.	  	  	  	  Then	   take	   specialization.	   	   According	   to	   some	   (for	   example	  Michael	   Storper,	  2013)	  specialization	  is	  the	  motor	  of	  city	  and	  regional	  growth.	  	  But	  is	  it?	  	  Again,	  the	   theoretical	   arguments	   are	   ambiguous,	   and	   the	   evidence	   very	   mixed.	  Economic	   geographers	   and	   regional	   studies	   experts	   have	   long	   debated	  whether	   sectoral	   specialization	   or	   sectoral	   variety	   is	   the	  most	   conducive	   to	  regional	   economic	   performance.	   	   This	   debate	   has	   echoes	   of	   the	   balanced	  versus	  unbalanced	  growth	  debate	  within	  development	  economics,	  mentioned	  above.	   Any	   impartial	   reading	   of	   the	   literature	   on	  whether	   specialization	   or	  diversification	   is	  better	   for	   regional	  and	  city	  growth	  would	   indicate	   that	   the	  matter	  is	  still	  undecided,	  and	  confused:	  one	  can	  find	  examples	  to	  support	  both	  views	   (Duranton	   and	   Puga,	   1999).	   	   One	   can	   point	   to	   certain	   present-­‐day	  regions	   and	   cities	   that	   owe	   their	   economic	   growth	   and	   success	   to	  specialization.	   But	   one	   can	   equally	   point	   to	   regions	   and	   cities	   that	   formerly	  enjoyed	  economic	  success	  based	  on	  this	  or	  that	  specialization	  but	  which	  are	  now	  languishing	  economically.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  one	  can	  point	  to	  successful	  	  
	  
Figure	  7:	  	  Specialisation	  and	  Growth	  in	  63	  UK	  Cities	  	  
(Krugman	  Specialisation	  Index,	  Average	  1981-­2011,	  and	  Average	  Growth	  Rate	  
of	  GVA,	  1981-­2011)14	  
Source:	  Martin,	  Tyler	  and	  Gardiner	  (2014)	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  regions	   and	   cities	   that	   have	   diversified	   economic	   structures.	   	   	   And	   while	  American	  scholars	  tend	  to	  argue	  that	  US	  cities	  have	  become	  more	  specialized	  and	   have	   diverged	   in	   their	   economic	   structures	   (Berry	   and	   Glaeser,	   2005;	  Moretti,	  2013;	  Storper,	  et	  al,	  2014),	  the	  evidence	  on	  British	  cities	  suggests	  that	  the	  trends	  here	  are	  somewhat	  different,	  and	  that	  if	  anything	  cities	  have	  been	  undergoing	   structural	   convergence	   (O’Donoghue,	   2000;	   Martin,	   Tyler	   and	  Gardiner,	  2014).	   	  Certainly	  for	  the	  UK	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  relationship	  between	  specialization	   and	   growth;	   what	   relationship	   there	   is	   appears	   to	   be	  curvilinear,	   positive	   up	   to	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   specialization,	   but	   negative	  thereafter	  (Figure	  7).	  However,	  overall,	  the	  relationship	  is	  weak.	  	  And	  so	  the	  debate	  goes	  on.15	  Some	  have	  sought	  to	  resolve	  the	  specialization-­‐versus-­‐variety	   impasse	   by	   introducing	   other	   concepts,	   for	   example	  ‘diversified	   specialization’	   and	   ‘related	   variety’,	   the	   former	   referring	   to	   the	  case	  where	   a	   region’s	   or	   city’s	   economy	   is	   dominated	   by,	   say	   three	   or	   four	  major	  sectors	  of	  activity	  (Farhauer	  and	  Kröll,	  2011),	   the	   latter	   to	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  number	  of	  sectors	  share	  complementary	  knowledges,	  technologies	  or	  inputs	  (Frenken,	  Van	  Oort	  and	  Verburg,	  2007).	  Yet	  again,	  however,	   the	   logic	  underpinning	   these	   ideas	   is	   not	   unassailable.	   	   Just	   how	  many	   (or	   how	   few)	  dominant	  sectors	  are	  needed	  to	  define	  ‘diversified	  specialisation’?	  And	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘related	  variety’	  surely	  it	  matters	  what	  the	  sectors	  are	  that	  are	  related	  –	  and	  how	  they	  are	  related?	  	  Relatedness	  among	  similarly	  weak,	  declining	  or	  lagging	   sectors	   may	   have	   quite	   different	   consequences	   from	   relatedness	  among	   a	   group	   of	   dynamic,	   buoyant	   activities.	   	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   extent	   of	  relatedness	   may	   be	   crucial:	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   relatedness	   may	   be	  advantageous,	  but	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  relatedness	  across	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  a	  region’s	   or	   city’s	   industries	  may	   in	   fact	   be	   a	   source	   of	   region-­‐	   or	   city-­‐wide	  economic	  and	  technological	  lock-­‐in,	  and	  of	  low	  resilience	  to	  shocks.	  	  And	  what	  if	  a	  region’s	  or	  city’s	  related	  variety	  is	  in	  fact	  dominated	  by,	  or	  dependent	  on	  just	   a	   few	   major	   producers?	   This	   could	   be	   growth	   inducing	   or	   potentially	  destabilising.	   	   What	   ultimately	   matters	   for	   a	   region’s	   (or	   city’s)	   economic	  success	   is	   its	   export	   base	   (see	   Rowthorn,	   2010),	   or	   more	   precisely	   the	  diversity	   of	   and	   sophistication	   of	   the	   products	   and	   services	   a	   region	  makes	  and	  trades,	  and	  thence	  how	  it	   ‘fits	   into’	   the	  wider	  national	  and	   international	  spaces	   of	   production,	   technology	   and	   trade.16	   A	   region’s	   or	   city’s	   economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	   See	   Palan	   (2010)	   for	   a	   useful	   evaluative	   survey	   of	   the	   range	   of	   different	  measures	   that	  have	  been	  used	  to	  measure	  structural	  specialisation	  and	  diversity.	  	  
16	   For	   an	   interesting	   approach	   to	   measuring	   and	   tracking	   how	   national	   regional	   and	   city	  economies	  ‘fit	  into’	  product	  and	  technological	  space,	  and	  how	  the	  complexity	  of	  that	  fit	  seems	  to	  be	  correlated	  with	  economic	  success,	  see	  Hausmann	  et	  al	  (2013).	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performance	   reflects	   the	   composition	   of	   its	   productive	   output	   and	   the	  structures	  that	  emerge	  to	  hold	  and	  combine	  knowledge.	  In	  this	  respect,	  there	  is	   no	   doubt	   that	   much	   of	   northern	   Britain	   has	   experienced	   difficulty	   in	  developing	  and	  attracting	  new	  types	  of	  activity	  and	  productive	  knowledge	  to	  replace	  the	  sustained	  loss	  of	   its	  manufacturing	  economy	  over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years.	   But	   theory	   does	   not	   provide	   a	   clear	   guide	   as	   to	   what	   these	   new	  activities	  or	  knowledges	  should	  be.	  	  	  	  	  One	   could	   go	   on	   to	   examine	   the	   numerous	   other	   concepts,	   ideas	   and	  paradigms	   that	   have	   emerged	   in	   regional	   studies	   in	   recent	   years.	   Surveying	  this	   literature,	   it	   can	   rightly	   be	   argued	   that	   we	   have	   learned	   much	   about	  certain	  aspects	  and	  sources	  of	  spatial	  economic	  development	  and	  how	  space	  and	   place	   matter	   for	   technological	   change,	   innovation,	   creativity	   and	  enterprise.	  	  Likewise,	  there	  is	  growing	  evidence	  that	  the	  quality	  and	  direction	  of	   local	   leadership	  and	  governance	  arrangements	  can	  be	  influential.	   	  Each	  of	  these	  ideas	  and	  paradigms	  provides	  a	  valuable	  lens	  on	  the	  process	  of	  regional	  development.	   	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   positive	   feature	   of	   all	   this	   cumulative	  collective	  intellectual	  enterprise	  is	  that	  it	  has	  produced	  a	  much	  wider	  palette	  of	  potential	  determinants	  of	  regional	  growth	  than	  one	  finds	  in	  the	  new	  spatial	  economics.	   There	   are	   however,	   two	   less	   positive	   and	   interrelated	   features.	  The	   first	   has	   been	   the	   sheer	   proliferation	   of	   concepts,	   all	   vying	   for	   our	  attention,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   each	   of	   these	   various	   concepts	   provides	   only	   a	  
partial	  explanation	  of	  uneven	  regional	  development.	  	  The	  second	  is	  that	  in	  the	  rush	   to	  devise	  new	  concepts	  and	  new	  empirical	   examples,	  we	   seem	   to	  have	  lost	  sight	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  bigger	  picture,	  the	  big	  processes	  and	  large	  structures,	   within	   which	   uneven	   regional	   development	   occurs:	   most	   of	   the	  analyses	  and	  accounts	  one	   finds	   in	  regional	  studies	  seem	  detached	   from	  the	  fundamental	   forces	   and	   logics	   of	   capital	   creation,	   circulation	   and	  accumulation.	  	  	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  proliferation,	  no	  sooner,	  it	  seems,	  has	  one	  new	  concept	  arrived	  on	   the	   regional	   studies	   stage	   than	   another	   is	   already	  waiting	   impatiently	   in	  the	   wings.	   	   What	   we	   have	   been	   much	   less	   successful	   at	   is	   integrating	   and	  
connecting	  this	  expanding	  plethora	  of	  partial	  theories	  and	  concepts	  by	  means	  of	   larger	   interpretive	  schemas,	  organizing	  principles	  or	   frameworks	  so	  as	   to	  give	  them	  some	  measure	  of	  coherence.	   	  While	  we	  generally	  extol	  conceptual	  diversity	   for	   its	   power	   to	   detect	   multiple	   facets	   and	   features	   of	   a	   complex	  reality,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  wary	  of	  the	  price	  that	  can	  be	  paid	  for	  cultivating	  it.	  The	  greater	   the	   diversity	   of	   concepts,	   theories	   and	   methods,	   the	   greater	   the	  difficulty	  of	  finding	  common	  denominators	  that	  link	  them,	  of	  knowing	  under	  what	  conditions	  and	  circumstances	  the	  different,	  multi-­‐scalar	  determinants	  of	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regional	   development	   come	   into	   play	   and	   interact	   to	   determine	   particular	  outcomes.	   	  This	   is	  really	   important	   if	  we	  want	  to	   influence	  policy.	   	   Influence	  comes	   not	   just	   from	   amassing	   numerous	   concepts,	   partial	   theories,	   case	  studies,	   or	   empirical	   facts.	   It	   also	   comes	   from	   effective	   synthesis	   and	  
integration.	   	   We	   seek	   to	   know	   the	   ‘causes’	   of	   regional	   development,	   we	  undertake	  analyses	  of	  this	  or	  that	  ‘cause’.	  	  But	  relatively	  few	  such	  findings	  are	  sufficient	  of	  themselves	  to	  provide	  a	  full	  understanding	  of,	   let	  alone	  a	  means	  of	  ameliorating,	  the	  problem	  of	  combined	  and	  uneven	  regional	  development.	  As	  a	  UK	  Government	  research	  analyst	  recently	  quizzed	  me:	  “I’ve	  read	  a	  lot	  of	  regional	  studies	  articles	  and	  books	  over	  the	  past	  months	  and	  am	  bewildered	  by	   the	   sheer	   range	   of	   ideas	   about	   the	   determinants	   of	   regional	   growth	   and	  development.	  As	  a	  policy-­‐advisor,	  just	  what	  do	  I	  do	  with	  all	  these?	  	  Is	  it	  just	  a	  ‘pick-­‐and-­‐mix’	   issue,	   and	   if	   it	   is,	  when,	  where	   and	  what	  do	   I	   pick	   and	  mix?”	  Good	   questions.	   	   This	   is	   where	   the	   new	   spatial	   economics	   does	   score	   over	  regional	  studies	  since	   it	   is	  at	   least	  able	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  same	  basic	  model	  –	  based	  on	  the	   tension	  between	  agglomeration	  (centripetal)	   forces	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  dispersion	  (centrifugal)	   forces	  on	  the	  other	   	   -­‐	  applies	  at	  all	   spatial	  scales;	  to	  quote	  some	  of	  its	  leading	  exponents:	  	  	   the	  models	   we	   construct	   to	   analyse	  many	   different	   issues	   turn	   out	   to	  have	  similar	  ‘deep	  structures’.	  The	  same	  equations	  reappear,	  albeit	  with	  somewhat	   different	   interpretations	   of	   the	   parameters,	   and	   the	  qualitative	  behaviour	  of	  the	  model	  economy	  usually	  turns	  on	  a	  couple	  of	  repeated	   expressions	   reflecting	   the	   tension	   between	   centripetal	   and	  centrifugal	  forces	  (Fujita	  et	  al,	  1999,p.	  345).	  	  	  Whilst,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  above,	  it	  is	  working	  this	  tension	  far	  too	  hard	  to	  expect	  it	   to	   provide	   a	   full,	   historically	   informed	   and	   contextualized	   explanation	   of	  uneven	   regional	   development,	   the	   lack	   of	   any	   integrative	   framework	   or	  principles	  in	  regional	  studies	  is	  just	  as	  problematic.	  	  The	  task	  here,	  as	  I	  see	  it,	  is	  twofold.	  	  The	  first	  is	  to	  link	  and	  ground	  our	  various	  partial	  ideas	  and	  concepts	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  encompassing	  schema	  that	  sets	  out	  how	  the	  various	  determinants	  and	  causes	  of	  regional	  economic	  development	  identified	  within	  the	  regional	  studies	  literature	  come	  together	  and	  interact	  to	  explain	   how	  particular	   patterns	   and	   forms	   of	   uneven	   regional	   development	  have	   evolved	   to	   be	   what	   they	   are,	   and	   how	   they	   are	   continuing	   to	   evolve.	  Relatedly,	   the	   second	   is	   to	   refocus	   our	   analytical	   lens	   more	   firmly	   on	   the	  question	  of	  how	   the	  particular	   cases	   and	   instances	  of	   regional	  development	  we	  study	  relate	  to	  the	  wider	  system(s)	  of	  which	  they	  are	  a	  part	  –	  how	  uneven	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regional	   development	   is	   a	   combined,	   relational	   process.17	   We	   sometimes	  study	  individual	  instances	  of	  regional	  development	  as	  a	  means	  of	  grasping	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  specific	  cases.	  	  Often	  we	  adopt	  a	  universalizing	  perspective,	  in	  which	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  establishing	  that	  every	  case	  of	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  regional	   development	   follows	   essentially	   the	   same	   ‘rules’	   and	   displays	   the	  same	  sorts	  of	  mechanisms	  and	  processes.18	   	  Less	  often,	  we	  seek	  generalizing	  accounts,	   in	  which	  the	  aim	  is	   to	  establish	  a	  principle	  of	  variation	   in	  regional	  development	  by	  examining	   systematic	  differences	  among	   regions.	   	  What	  we	  do	  even	  less,	   I	  suggest,	   is	  to	  attempt	  to	  construct	  encompassing	  explanations	  that	  seek	  to	  compare	  and	  account	  for	  differences	  in	  growth	  and	  development	  between	   regions	   by	   placing	   them	   within	   the	   same	   system,	   on	   the	   way	   to	  
explaining	  their	  characteristics	  as	  a	  function	  of	  their	  varying	  relationship	  to	  the	  
system	   as	   a	  whole.	   	   	   	   The	   idea	   of	   ‘encompassing	   comparisons’	   as	   a	  method,	  indeed	   goal,	   of	   explanation	   is	   taken	   from	   Tilley	   (1989).	   	   He	   suggests	   that	  encompassing	   explanations	   are	   necessarily	   concerned	   to	   give	   meaning	   to	  specific	   instances	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  in	  terms	  of	   their	  relationship	  to	  a	   larger	  system,	   and	   that	   in	   forging	   such	   explanations	   the	   focus	   is	   not	   just	   on	   the	  specifics	  of	  each	  case	  but	  also	  on	  the	  ‘big	  processes’	  and	  large	  structures’	  that	  link	  and	  bind	  those	  cases	  together	  as	  a	  system.	  	  It	  is	  the	  multifarious	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  cases	  relate	  the	  larger	  ‘whole’	  that	  imbues	  both	  the	  cases	  and	  the	  whole	  with	  complexity.	  	  	  Opinions	  will	  differ,	   of	   course,	   over	  what	   form	  an	  encompassing	   framework	  for	  regional	  studies	  should	  take.	  Some	  might	  recoil	  from	  the	  mere	  suggestion	  that	  we	  should	  be	  seeking	  such	  an	  encompassing	  approach	  at	  all,	  arguing	  that	  it	   carries	   the	   dangers	   of	   monism,	   reductionism	   and	   functionalism.	   	   In	  economic	   geography	   particularly,	   but	   also	   in	   regional	   studies,	   over	   the	   past	  two	   decades	   there	   has	   been	   an	   explicit	   and	   deliberate	   move	   away	   from	  general	  explanatory	  frameworks,	  holistic	  thinking,	  or	  meta-­‐principles,	  a	  move	  that	   has	   merely	   encouraged	   the	   very	   proliferation	   of	   diverse	   concepts	   and	  approaches	   with	   which	   we	   are	   now	   confronted.	   	   	   Indeed,	   such	   diversity	   is	  actively	   celebrated	   by	   some.	   	   We	   have	   a	   plurality	   of	   regional	   development	  accounts,	   often	   with	   limited	   exchange	   between	   them.	   	   As	   Barnes	   and	  Sheppard	  bemoan,	   the	  discipline	  (they	  are	  referring	  to	  economic	  geography,	  but	   the	   same	   can	   be	   said	   of	   regional	   studies	   more	   generally)	   is	   being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	   One	   of	   the	   earliest	   attempts	   to	   emphasise	   the	   combined	   nature	   of	   uneven	   regional	  development,	   drawing	  on	   a	   fusion	  of	  Harrod-­‐	   type	   economic	   growth	   and	   instability	   theory,	  agglomeration	   theory,	   monopoly	   theory,	   and	   notions	   of	   cumulative	   causation,	   is	   Holland	  (1976).	   	  No-­‐one	   reads	   this	   study	  any	  more,	   yet	   its	   attempt	   to	   integrate	   several	   ideas	   into	  a	  general	  account	  of	  regional	  economic	  imbalance	  still	  holds	  some	  valuable	  lessons	  for	  today.	  	  
18	  This	   is	   precisely	   the	   intention	   behind	  NEG	  models,	   as	   the	   previous	   quote	   by	   Fujita	   and	  Thisse	  illustrates	  so	  well.	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“increasingly	  fragmented	  into	  a	  series	  of	  intellectual	  solitudes	  that	  has	  created	  isolation,	  producing	  monologues	  rather	  than	  conversations”	  (2010,	  p.	  193).	  In	  response	  they	  have	  called	  for	  an	  ‘engaged	  pluralism’,	  which	  they	  define	  as	  an	  approach	  “based	  on	  dialogue,	  translation,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  trading	  zones...	  that	   recognizes	   and	   connects	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	   circulating	   local	  epistemologies:	  a	   politics	   of	   difference	   rather	   than	   consensus”	   (op	   cit.	   p.193,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  	  But	   as	   Simandan	   (2011)	   has	   cogently	   argued,	   a	   commitment	   to	   ‘engaged	  pluralism’	   along	   these	   lines	   seems	   to	   arise	   as	  much	   from	   a	   rejection	   of	   the	  possibility	  of	  an	  integrating	  or	  unifying	  ambition	  as	  from	  a	  concern	  over	  the	  proliferation	   of	   partial	   and	   competing	   knowledge	   claims.	   Indeed	   their	  argument	  seems	  explicitly	  to	  reject	  the	  idea	  of	  consensus	  around	  a	  commonly	  agreed	   theoretical	   and	   methodological	   framework	   or	   set	   of	   principles	   by	  means	   of	  which	   to	   unify	   and	   integrate	   different	   sets	   of	   ideas	   about	   uneven	  regional	  development.	   	   	  But	  how	  do	  we	  make	   the	  connections	  between,	  and	  create	  a	  dialogue	  among,	  the	  diverse	  range	  of	  ‘local	  epistemologies’	  that	  make	  up	   regional	   studies,	   if	   not	   by	   agreeing	   on	   some	   common,	   unifying	   or	  encompassing	  principles	  (in	  effect	  the	  ‘rules	  of	  engagement’)?	  	  Encompassing	  approaches	   to	   the	   study	   of	   regional	   development	   would	   have	   the	   twin	  advantages	  of	  directly	  taking	  account	  of	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	  ostensibly	  separate	  regional	  experiences	  and	  of	  providing	  a	  strong	   incentive	   to	  ground	  analyses	   explicitly	   in	   the	  historical	   contexts	   of	   the	   structures	   and	  processes	  they	  include.	  	  	  Confronted	  with	  an	  entrenched	  configuration	  of	  spatial	  disparities	  in	  relative	  economic	  growth	  and	  prosperity	  –	  of	  the	  sort	  we	  find	  in	  the	  UK	  -­‐	  we	  need	  to	  move	   back	   in	   time,	   looking	   for	   the	   crucial	   choices	   and	   events	   	   -­‐	   rapid	   or	  gradual	  –	  that	  set	  places	  on	  different	  paths	  of	  development.	  	  The	  precocity	  or	  lateness	   (or	   even	   absence)	   of	   industrialization;	   the	   disruptive,	   creative	   (but	  also	   destructive)	   force	   of	   major	   technological	   advances;	   the	   coercive	  pressures	   of	   new	   and	   emerging	   international	   competitors	   (that	   is,	   the	  expansion	   and	   development	   of	   the	   global	   economy);	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	  sectors	  of	  economic	  activity	  and	  new	  circuits	  of	  capital;	  shifts	  in	  the	  form	  and	  orientation	   of	   State	   interventions	   in	   the	   management,	   regulation	   and	  governance	   of	   the	   economy;	   these	   and	   other	   ‘big’	   processes	   and	   ‘large’	  structures	   constitute	   the	  encompassing	   conceptual	   framework	  within	  which	  the	   processes	   and	   mechanisms	   that	   have	   led	   to	   present	   geographical	  disparities	   have	   to	   be	   explained.	   	   It	   is	   within	   such	   an	   historically	   inflected	  encompassing	   framework	   that	   we	   can	   then	   ground	   specific	   ‘timeless’	   and	  abstract	  conceptual	  schemas	  	  -­‐	  such	  as	  clusters,	  agglomeration,	  specialization,	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and	  so	  on	  -­‐	  which	  thereby	  both	  acquire	  and	  contribute	  explanatory	  meaning.	  	  The	  idea	  then	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  evolving	  uneven	  geographical	  development	  of	  a	  country	   like	   that	   of	   the	  UK	   as	   a	   cumulative	   consequence	   of	   its	   regions’	   and	  cities’	   connections	   to	   and	   involvement	   in	   the	   differentiating	   processes	   that	  have	  transformed	  the	  economy	  over	  time,	  up	  to	  the	  present.	  	  	  The	   emphasis	   on	   ‘cumulative’	   here	   is	   intentional.	  What	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  studying	   and	   explaining	   the	   evolving	   pattern	   of	   uneven	   geographical	  development	   in	   any	   economy	   is	   a	   complex	   process	   of	   spatially	   biased	  cumulative	  causation,	  not	  just	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  development	  but	  also	  
of	   political-­institutional	   evolution.	   The	  heterodox	   economist	  Mark	   Setterfield	  (1997),	   for	   example	   has	   suggested	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   cumulative	   causation	  should	   be	   a	   foundational	   principle	   of	   non-­‐equilibrium-­‐historical	   economics.	  This	   is	   interesting	   since	   according	   to	   the	   economic	   geographer	   Allen	   Scott,	  any	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  process	  of	  uneven	  regional	  development	  must	  	  	   formulate	   the	   problem	   by	   reference	   to	   a	   dynamic	   of	   cumulative	   causation	  whose	   logic	   is	   definable	  not	   in	   terms	  of	   some	  primum	  mobile	   or	   first	   cause,	  but	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   own	   historical	   momentum…	   this	   points	   …	   to	   the	  importance	  of	  an	  ontology	  of	  regional	  growth	  and	  development	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	   the	   idea	   of	   path	  dependent	   economic	   evolution	   and	   recursive	   interaction	  	  (2006,	  p.	  85).	  	  	  	  Unfortunately,	   economic	   geographers	   and	   regional	   studies	   scholars	   have	  never	   thoroughly	  developed	  or	  analysed	   the	   idea	  of	   circular	  and	  cumulative	  causation	  (even	   if	   they	  have	   invoked	   the	   terminology),	  yet	   it	   is	   fundamental	  	  for	  subsuming	  and	  synthesizing	  many	  of	  the	  ‘drivers’	  of	  regional	  development	  that	   have	   come	   to	   populate	   contemporary	   regional	   studies.	   	   Cumulative	  causation	   takes	   place	   at	   all	   spatial	   scales,	  within	   the	   individual	   firm,	  within	  clusters,	   cities,	   regions	   and	   at	   the	   global	   level.	   It	   occurs	   in	   innovation,	   skill	  formation,	   and	   in	   institutional	   and	   political	   governance,	   indeed	   in	   almost	  every	  aspect	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  evolution.	  	  	  Indeed,	  the	  attraction	  of	  the	  circular	  and	  cumulative	  causation	  idea	  as	  it	  was	  developed	  by	   early	   exponents	   such	   as	  Veblen	   and	  Myrdal,	  was	   as	   a	   form	  of	  heterodox,	   non-­‐equilibrium	   political	   economy	   that	   explained	   the	   dynamics	  and	   spatialities	   of	   growth	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   self	   reinforcing	   interaction	   of	  economic	   and,	   crucially,	   institutional	   and	   political	   structures	   and	   processes	  (Martin,	   2015).	   	   Regrettably,	   in	   subsequent	   work	   the	   institutional	   and	  political	  dimensions	  were	  downplayed	  or	  dropped	  entirely,	  so	  that	  the	  notion	  became	  more	  or	  less	  narrowly	  synonymous	  with	  increasing	  returns	  models	  of	  export	  driven	  growth,	   especially	  under	  Kaldor’s	   influence	   (see,	   for	   example,	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Kaldor,	  1981).	   	  As	  Krugman	  (1991,	  1995)	  himself	  has	  openly	  conceded,	   this	  made	   the	   idea	   easy	   to	   formalise	   mathematically,	   which	   in	   turn	   made	   it	   an	  attractive	   ingredient	   of	   NEG	   models,	   where	   it	   has	   lost	   any	   vestige	   of	  institutional	   and	   political	   significance	   and,	   ironically,	   has	   become	   a	  mechanism	  making	  for	  spatial	  equilibrium	  (see	  Bhattacharjea,	  2010)!	  	  	  In	   the	  past	   few	  years,	   however,	  heterodox	  economists	  have	  begun	   to	   revive	  the	   political	   economy	   and	   historical	   dimensions	   of	   circular	   and	   cumulative	  causation	   	   (eg.	   Toner,	   1999;	   Berger,	   2009;	   Setterfield,	   2010).	   	   In	   this	  work,	  circular	   and	   cumulative	   causation	   emerges	   as	   a	   complex	   system	   of	   ideas	  whose	   strength	   lies	   in	   viewing	   technical	   phenomena,	   such	   as	   increasing	  returns	   and	   agglomeration	   externalities,	   as	   inseparable	   from	   historical,	  institutional,	  political	  and	  cultural	  processes.	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  UK,	  for	  example,	  has	  one	  of	  the	  most	  spatially	  centralized	  financial	  systems	  and	  state	  forms	   of	   any	   OECD	   nation.	   	   Both	   are	   highly	   concentrated	   in	   London,	   and	  largely	  controlled	  from	  there.	  State	  spending	  and	  the	  national	  policy-­‐making	  apparatus	   are	   London	   based	   and	   London	   centric.	   The	   banking	   system	   is	  overwhelmingly	  concentrated	  there,	  as	  are	  the	  stock	  market,	  venture	  capital	  and	   private	   equity	  markets,	   pension	   fund	   institutions	   and	   the	  whole	   raft	   of	  legal	  and	  professional	  services	  that	  help	  support	  those	  financial	  circuits.	  	  Time	  was	  when	  the	  UK	  had	  a	  regional	  banking	  system,	  regional	  stock	  markets,	  and	  city	   and	   local	   authorities	   raised	   the	   bulk	   of	   their	   finances	   locally.	   Today,	   all	  three	   are	   concentrated	   and	   controlled	   from	   London.	   As	   Dow	   (1999)	   has	  argued,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   a	   nation’s	   financial	   system	   becomes	   increasingly	  concentrated	   organizationally	   and	   increasingly	   centralized	   spatially,	  especially	  if	  focused	  on	  a	  national	  financial	  centre	  that	  is	  also	  a	  global	  financial	  hub	  –	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  London	  –	  the	  more	  likely	  is	  that	  system	  to	  experience	  a	   cumulatively	   reinforced	   economic	   imbalance	   between	   the	   centre	   and	   the	  regions.	  	  	  	  It	  would	  be	  stretching	  credulity	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  success	  of	  London	  and	  the	  surrounding	  South	  East	  is	  simply	  due	  to	  the	  rational	   ‘spatial	  sorting’	  of	  workers	  and	  firms	  and	  has	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  historical	  cumulative	  concentration	   of	   the	   nation’s	   key	   financial,	   institutional	   and	   political	  structures	  there,	  or	  that	  this	  concentration	  of	  financial,	  corporate	  and	  political	  power	  and	  decision-­‐making	  has	  played	  no	  role	  in	  the	  growth	  and	  persistence	  of	  spatial	  economic	  imbalance	  between	  the	  North	  and	  South	  of	  the	  country.	  	  In	  effect,	   the	   recursive	   circular	   and	   cumulative	   forces	   making	   for	   spatial	  economic	   imbalance	   in	   the	   UK	   have	   themselves	   become	   institutionalized,	  embedded	   in	   the	   national	   political	   economy,	   itself	   spatially	   concentrated	   in	  and	   controlled	   from	   London.	   	   Understanding	   the	   political	   and	   institutional	  nature	  of	  this	  cumulative	  historical	  process	  is	  vital:	  the	  role	  of	  such	  factors	  as	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regional	   differences	   in	   specialization,	   technological	   innovation,	   skills	   and	   so	  on	  has	  to	  be	  set	  within	  this	  national	  political	  economy.	  	  An	   encompassing	   explanatory	   framework,	   therefore,	   should	   insist	   on	   the	  interaction	  of	  the	  economic,	  political,	  institutional	  and	  social.	  	  It	  is	  necessarily	  historical	   and	   evolutionary	   in	   orientation.	   The	   tension	   between	   the	  geographical	  concentration	  and	  dispersion	  of	  capital	  is	  only	  one	  tension	  that	  produces	  uneven	  regional	  development.	   	  Another	   is	   that	  between	  continuity	  and	  change,	  between	   the	  preservation	  of	  old	  development	  paths	  and	  spatial	  forms	  and	   the	  creation	  of	  new	  paths	  and	   forms.	   	  A	  key	  principle	  of	   regional	  studies,	   therefore,	   is	   that	   it	   should	   be	   concerned	   with	   how	   economic	  landscapes	  evolve	   and	   the	   role	   of	   ‘creative	  destruction’	   in	   that	  process,	  why	  evolution	  (creative	  destruction)	  occurs	  unevenly	  across	  space,	  why	  economic	  change	   is	   led	  by	   certain	   cities	   and	   regions	   in	  one	  period,	   but	  by	  others	   in	   a	  different	  period,	  or	  why	  some	  cities	  and	  regions	  perhaps	  manage	  to	  lead	  and	  dominate	  successive	  phases	  of	  economic	  change.	   	  We	  need	  an	  approach	  that	  takes	  history	  seriously	  because	  we	  cannot	  understand	  the	  present,	  nor	  begin	  to	  fashion	  policies	  to	  shape	  the	  future,	  unless	  we	  understand	  how	  we	  have	  got	  to	  where	  we	  are	  and	  hence	  where	  and	  what	  the	   focus	  of	  policy	   intervention	  should	   be	   (Boschma	   and	   Martin,	   2010).	   An	   evolutionary	   perspective	   has	   a	  number	   of	   advantages.19	   It	   makes	   no	   assumptions	   or	   presumptions	   about	  equilibrium	   in	   the	   economic	   landscape;	   instead,	   it	   stresses	   dynamics.	   It	  directs	   us	   to	   examine	   the	   path	   dependent	   nature	   of	   uneven	   regional	  development,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  what	  makes	  for	  the	  uneven	  adaptability	  of	  city	  and	  regional	  economies,	  including	  the	  role	  of	  innovation	  and	  the	  creation	  of	   novelty,	   new	   variety	   and	   new	   paths	   in	   that	   process	   (Martin	   and	   Sunley,	  2006;	  Martin,	  2010).	  	  	  	  Not	  only	  should	  encompassing	  conceptual	  map	  be	  historical	  and	  evolutionary	  in	  orientation,	  so	  too	  it	  should	  assign	  primary	  importance	  to	  the	  political	  and	  institutional.	  	  It	  is	  fashionable	  to	  argue	  that	  with	  globalization,	  national	  states	  have	  become	  increasingly	  powerless	  and	  irrelevant.	  While	  they	  have	  certainly	  lost	  some	  of	  their	  authority	  and	  autonomy	  to	  global	  capital,	  they	  nevertheless	  remain	  powerful	  actors	   in	  shaping	  how	  their	  cities	  and	  regions	  succeed	  and	  compete	  in	  the	  wider	  international	  economy.	  The	  state	  is	  the	  primary	  vehicle	  to	  assure	  the	  creation	  and	  stability	  of	  the	  collective	  conditions	  for	  production,	  consumption	   and	   exchange:	   as	   such	   the	   national	   political-­‐administrative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  As	  the	  late	  and	  eminent	  urban	  scholar,	  Sir	  Peter	  Hall,	  once	  put	  it:	  	  	   “As	  is	  commonly	  the	  case	  with	  the	  geography	  of	  a	  complex	  economic	  unit,	  the	  	   present	  	  makes	  no	  sense	  until	   it	   is	  related	  to	  the	  evolutionary	  process	  which	  	   has	  produced	  it.”	  (Peter	  Hall,	  The	  Industries	  of	  London,	  1962)	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system	  is	  always	  an	  active	  agent	   in	  capital	  circulation	  and	  accumulation	  and	  how	   these	   are	   distributed	   across	   space.	   	   In	   these	   neoliberal	   times,	   states	  compete	  one	  with	  another	  to	  ‘capture’	  and	  ‘fix’	  a	  share	  of	  increasingly	  mobile	  capital	  within	   their	   territories	   	   -­‐	   for	  example,	  by	  creating	  a	   low-­‐tax,	  weakly-­‐regulated	  ‘good	  business	  climate’	  and,	  where	  the	  opportunity	  exists,	  as	  in	  the	  UK,	  by	  promoting	  and	  supporting	  their	   ‘global	  city’	  –	  even	  if	  that	  means	  that	  other	   cities	   and	   regions	   are	   neglected	   or	   disadvantaged	   in	   the	   process.	   	   Of	  course,	   states	   differ	   in	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	   have	   engaged	   in	   this	  neoliberal	  mode	  of	  economic	  governance.	  But	  the	  basic	  point	  stands:	  national	  political-­‐administrative	   and	   economic	   governance	   systems	   and	   their	  territorial	   structures	   	   (for	  example,	  whether	  highly	  centralized	  or	  devolved)	  can	   significantly	   influence	   the	   geography	   of	   economic	   growth	   and	  development	   within	   their	   jurisdictions,	   through	   their	   macro-­‐economic	  policies,	   taxation	  and	  spending	  priorities,	   funding	  of	   infrastructures,	  welfare	  programmes	   and	   so	   on.	   And	   how	   they	   attempt	   to	   mediate	   or	   resolve	   the	  periodic	   crises	   of	   capitalism	   through	   fiscal	   and	   monetary	   measures	   can	  likewise	   have	   highly	   spatially	   differentiated	   and	   unequal	   outcomes,	  witness	  the	   spatially	   uneven	   impact	   that	   current	   fiscal	   austerity	   programmes	   are	  having	  across	  many	  countries.	   	   	   In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  institutional	  forms	  and	   structures	   of	   a	   given	   national	   political	   economy	   have	   been	   argued	   to	  influence	   its	   ‘variety	   of	   capitalism’	   and	   its	   comparative	   advantage	   (Hall	   and	  Soskice,	   2001),	   so	   it	  might	   be	   expected	   that	   those	   same	   institutional	   forms	  and	   structures	   will	   shape	   that	   nation’s	   internal	   geographies	   of	   economic	  growth	  and	  prosperity.	  	  	  	  In	   short,	   what	   we	   need	   is	   we	   need	   an	   ‘evolutionary-­‐historical	   geographical	  political	  economy’	  within	  which	  our	  various	  partial	  theories	  and	  explanatory	  schemas	  could	  be	  given	  coherence	  and	  focus.	  	  It	  is	  beyond	  my	  scope	  and	  remit	  here	   to	   set	   out	   in	   detail	  what	   such	   an	   encompassing	   framework	  might	   look	  like	   and	   how	   it	   might	   function	   as	   a	   structure	   for	   unifying	   or	   integrating	  existing	  approaches	  in	  regional	  studies.	  Rather,	  my	  aim	  is	  to	  stimulate	  debate	  and	   discussion	   around	   this	   issue,	   and	   hopefully	   others	   will	   take	   up	   the	  challenge.	  	  But	  it	  does	  seem	  to	  me	  that	  some	  such	  framework	  would	  offer	  a	  far	  more	  compelling	  account	  of	  spatial	  economic	  imbalance	  within	  (and	  between)	  countries	  than	  is	  provided	  by	  either	  NEG/NUE	  type	  models	  or	  by	  the	  plethora	  of	   regional	   studies	   ideas	   that	   now	   exists.	   	   An	   encompassing	   ‘evolutionary-­‐historical	  geographical	  political	  economy’	  could	  be	  deployed	  in	  various	  ways.	  The	  most	  challenging	  and	  demanding	  would	  be	  a	  ‘total	  national	  system’	  type	  of	   analysis,	   which	   would	   aim	   to	   understand	   and	   explain	   a	   nation-­‐wide	  evolving	   pattern	   of	   combined	   and	   uneven	   geographical	   development,	   set	   in	  the	  context	  of	  that	  national	  economy’s	  changing	  external	  global	   linkages	  and	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interactions	  and	  its	  evolving	  internal	  institutional	  and	  political	  structures.	  We	  do	  little	   if	  any	  such	  work.	   	  Alternatively,	  one	  could	  focus	  on	  just	  a	  particular	  region	  or	  city	  region,	  and	  conduct	  what	  we	  might	  call	  a	   ‘total	  place’	  analysis,	  wherein	   we	   examine	   that	   region’s	   or	   city’s	   economy	   in	   all	   its	   multi-­‐scalar	  detail,	   as	   a	   complex	   open	   system	   set	   within	   the	   relevant	   national	   and	  international	   networks	   and	   structures	   to	  which	   it	   relates	   and	  with	  which	   it	  interacts.	   	   We	   rarely	   conduct	   such	   analyses,	   but	   typically	   focus	   just	   on	  particular	  aspects	  or	  sectors	  of	  a	  given	  region	  or	  city.	  And	  then	  there	  are	  in-­‐depth	  ‘contrastive	  comparisons’,	  a	  variant	  of	  ‘total	  place’	  analysis	  in	  which	  the	  aim	   is	   to	  understand	  why	   the	   contrasting	   cities	   or	   regions	   in	  question	  have	  evolved	  differently	  and	  possibly	  divergently,	  economically,	  by	  virtue	  of	   their	  different	   interactions	  with	   and	   role	   within	   their	   wider	   national	   and	   indeed	  global	  contexts.	  	  	  Choosing	  such	  contrastive	  comparisons	  carefully	  might	  even	  give	  us	  a	  means	  of	  undertaking	  ‘what-­‐if’	  and	  ‘counterfactual’	  type	  enquiries.20	  	  	  6.	  	  Whither	  Spatial	  Rebalancing?	  	  So	  where	  does	  all	  this	  leave	  the	  task	  of	  spatially	  rebalancing	  the	  UK	  economy?	  The	   UK	   has	   had	   some	   form	   of	   regional	   policy	   aimed	   at	   securing	   a	   more	  spatially	  balanced	  pattern	  of	   growth	  and	  prosperity	   for	   close	  on	  90	  years.21	  	  The	   fact	   that	   spatial	   disparities	   across	   the	   economy	   still	   persist	   –	   and	   have	  widened	   over	   the	   past	   three	   decades	   -­‐	   suggests	   that	   previous	   policies	   have	  not	   achieved	   as	   much	   as	   was	   hoped	   or	   intended.	   It	   would	   be	   tempting	   to	  argue,	  as	  some	  do,	  that	  this	  confirms	  that	  regional	  and	  urban	  policy	  can	  never	  achieve	  much	  since	  it	  is	  trying	  to	  work	  against	  the	  forces	  of	  the	  market,	  which	  in	   the	  UK	   ‘naturally’	   favour	   the	   concentration	   of	   growth	   in	   London	   and	   the	  South	  East.	  	  	  	  A	   different,	   more	   realistic,	   but	   also	  more	   challenging,	   viewpoint	   is	   that	   the	  problem	  is	  not	  that	  regional	  policy	  is	  trying	  to	  work	  against	  the	  ‘market’,	  but	  against	  systemic	  features	  that	  have	  to	  do	  with	  how	  the	  economy	  is	  run,	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	   This	   was	   the	   sort	   of	   enquiry	   that	   Chinitz	   (1961)	   appeared	   to	   be	   calling	   for	   in	   his	  comparison	   of	   the	   contrasting	   economic	   structures	   and	   growth	   rates	   of	   New	   York	   and	  Pittsburgh,	   although	  his	  discussion	  does	  not	   situate	   these	   two	  cities	   in	   their	  wider	  national	  and	   international	   systems	   of	   interactions	   and	   dependencies.	   	   A	   contemporary	   example	   of	  what	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  is	  Storper	  et	  al’s	  (2014)	  comparison	  of	  Los	  Angeles	  and	  San	  Francisco.	  	  
21	  	  The	  first	  experiment	  to	  revive	  the	  depressed	  northern	  areas	  of	  Britain	  was	  the	  Industrial	  Transference	   Scheme,	   initiated	   in	   1928.	   This	   ‘move	  workers	   to	   the	  work’	   policy	   sought	   to	  move	  unemployed	  workers	   from	  the	  structurally	  declining	  coalfields	   in	  northern	  regions	   to	  employment	  opportunities	  in	  the	  more	  prosperous	  south.	  It	  was	  not	  a	  great	  success,	  and	  was	  followed,	  in	  1934,	  by	  the	  Special	  Areas	  Act,	  in	  effect	  a	  ‘move	  work	  to	  the	  workers’	  policy	  since	  it	  aimed	  to	  attract	  new	  industrial	  investment	  to	  the	  depressed	  areas.	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our	  economic,	  financial	  and	  political	  structures,	  with	  the	  priorities	  adopted	  by	  successive	  governments,	  and	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  real	  political	  commitment	  to	  effect	   fundamental	   change;	   in	   short	   with	   the	   nation’s	   large	   political	   and	  institutional	   structures,	   its	   particular	   form	   of	   political	   economy	   and	  constitutional	   arrangements,	   and	   how	   these	   have	   evolved	   and	   been	  reproduced.	  	  Even	  in	  the	  ‘laissez	  faire’	  economy	  of	  the	  19thC	  the	  British	  State	  played	   an	   instrumental	   role	   in	   fashioning	   the	   nation’s	   economic	   geography.	  For	   example,	   the	   State’s	   expansion	   of	   Empire	   abroad	   and	   its	   associated	  prosecution	   of	   protected	   markets	   and	   trade,	   had	   no	   small	   bearing	   on	   the	  development	  and	  success	  of	  distinctive	  regional	  industrial	  specializations	  and	  complexes	  across	  the	  country,	   from	  the	  heavy	  industries	  of	  Northern	  Britain	  to	  the	  concentration	  of	  commerce,	  trade,	  finance	  and	  political	  administration	  in	  London.	  	  	  	  Fast	  forward	  to	  the	  recent	  past	  and	  again	  the	  State	  has	  once	  again	  helped	  forge	  a	  new	  phase	  in	  the	  country’s	  uneven	  regional	  development.	  	  The	  political	  decision	  to	  deregulate	  London’s	  financial	  markets	  and	  institutions	  in	  the	  late-­‐1980s	  by	  the	  Thatcher	  government	  was	  key	  to	  enabling	  the	  capital	  to	  secure	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  new	  international	  economy	  of	  global	  finance.	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  what	  power	  over	  public	  finance	  and	  spending	  that	  was	  enjoyed	  by	   local	   government	   in	   the	   regions	   was	   emasculated	   by	   the	   central	  government	  located	  in	  London	  on	  ideological	  grounds,	  both	  to	  shrink	  the	  state	  and	   curb	   what	   it	   saw	   as	   the	   socialist	   policies	   of	   Labour	   controlled	   local	  authorities.	   In	   various	   ways,	   the	   particular	   form	   and	   structure	   of	   the	   UK’s	  political-­‐institutional	   system	   has	   been,	   and	   continues	   to	   be,	   key	   to	  understanding	  the	  spatial	  imbalance	  within	  the	  national	  economy.	  	  	  In	   terms	   of	   regional	   policy,	   the	   UK	   currently	   has	   a	   raft	   of	   measures	   to	   aid	  particular	  sections	  of	  industry,	  to	  promote	  innovation,	  to	  help	  cities	  improve	  their	  infrastructures,	  to	  assist	  skills,	  to	  help	  small	  business	  enterprise,	  and	  so	  on	   –	   all	   the	   sort	   of	   things	   that	   one	   can	   find	   academic	   support	   for	   within	  particular	  strands	  of	  regional	  studies.	   	  And	  no	  doubt	  these	  are	  all	  potentially	  useful.	  The	  issue	  is	  whether	  all	  these	  add	  up	  to	  a	  strategy	  capable	  of	  securing	  the	  spatial	  economic	  balancing	  called	  for	  by	  the	  Government.	  I	  am	  doubtful.	  I	  suspect	   that,	   as	  with	  past	  policies,	   at	  best	   the	   impact	  of	   such	  polices	  will	  be	  small	   since,	   political	   rhetoric	   notwithstanding,	   such	   measures	   remain	  piecemeal,	  ‘add-­‐on’	  and	  marginal	  to	  the	  basic	  structures	  and	  workings	  of	  our	  national	   system	   of	   fiscal,	   monetary	   and	   economic	   management,	   which	   will	  continue	  to	  favour	  London	  and	  its	  environs.	  	  As	  Lord	  Heseltine	  argued	  back	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  and	  has	  voiced	  strongly	  again	  only	  recently	  (Heseltine,	  2013),	  the	   UK’s	   highly	   centralized	   system	   of	   Government	   spending	   and	   political	  control	   has	   long	  militated	   against	   the	   regions	   and	   cities	   outside	   London,	   in	  effect	  acting	  as	  a	  ‘counter-­‐regional	  policy’.	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  Yet	  is	  the	  UK	  at	  last	  witnessing	  the	  beginnings	  of	  an	  historical	  turning	  point,	  a	  distinctive	   turn	  which	  may	  possibly	  herald	  a	  new	  era	   in	  policy	   thinking	  and	  practice?	   Heseltine’s	   (2013)	   call	   for	   devolving	   £50billion	   of	   central	  Government	   spending	   each	   year	   to	   cities	   and	   localities	   outside	   London,	  combined	   with	   empowering	   the	   provincial	   cities	   and	   city-­‐regions	   with	  directly	  elected	  mayors,	   seems	   to	  have	   set	  a	  new	  ball	   rolling.	   	  The	  Coalition	  Government	   has	   recently	   devolved	   certain	   fiscal	   powers	   to	   a	   Greater	  Manchester	   combined	   authority,	   and	   Chancellor	   Osborne	   has	   recently	  declared	  that	  he	  regards	  the	  more	  general	  development	  of	  a	  new	  structure	  of	  devolved	  city-­‐region	  governance	  in	  northern	  Britain	  in	  order	  to	  rebalance	  the	  economy	  as	  his	  great	  personal	  project	  (quoted	  in	  Wintour,	  2015).	  And	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  promised	  devolution	  to	  Scotland	  of	  certain	  tax	  and	  spending	  powers	   has	   fuelled	   a	   growing	   call	   for	   fiscal	   devolution	   by	   English	   cities	  	  (‘metro-­‐devo’)	   of	   the	   sort	   Heseltine	   (op	   cit)	   has	   argued	   for.	   	   We	   might,	  perhaps,	  be	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  a	  new	  national	  political	  economy	  that	  has	  greater	  spatial	  balance	  as	  an	  explicit	  part	  of	  its	  structure.	  	  Of	   course,	   fiscal	   devolution	   is	   not	   a	   panacea	   for	   spatially	   rebalancing	   the	  economy	   (Rodriguez-­‐Pose	   and	   Ezcurra,	   2010).	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   a	  necessary	   condition,	   but	   not	   of	   itself	   automatically	   a	   sufficient	   one.	   It	   could	  end	  up	  favouring	  the	  very	  largest	  cities:	  London	  is	  already	  mounting	  a	  strong	  case	   to	   be	   allowed	   to	   keep	   its	   business	   rates	   and	  property	   taxes,	   and	   given	  that	  both	   land	  and	  property	  values	  are	  highest	   there,	   the	  revenues	  could	  be	  substantial.	   But	   by	   the	   same	   token,	   fiscal	   devolution	   could	   actually	  penalize	  less	   prosperous	   cities	   and	   regions	   and	   simply	   reinforce	   spatial	   economic	  imbalance	  across	  the	  country.	  Nor	  need	  fiscal	  devolution	  necessarily	  translate	  into	   effective	   and	   successful	   local	   economic	   growth	   and	   development.	  	  Furthermore,	   certain	   public	   expenditures	   and	   transfers	  will	   always	   need	   to	  remain	   funded	  and	  administered	   from	  the	  political	   centre.	  And	  while	  all	   the	  talk	  is	  of	  reviving	  and	   ‘powering	  up’	  northern	  cities,	  what	   in	  fact	   is	  the	  most	  appropriate	   geographical	   scale	   or	   unit	   for	   tackling	   spatial	   economic	  imbalance.	   Is	   it	   cities?	   Or	   city-­‐regions?	   Or	   regional	   groupings	   (systems)	   of	  cities	  (‘metro-­‐regions’)?	  	  How	  many	  cities:	  just	  a	  select	  few,	  or	  all?	  And	  what	  about	   the	   spaces	   ‘in	   between’?	  Notwithstanding	   these	   unresolved	   questions	  there	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   gathering	   momentum	   for	   a	   long-­‐overdue	  restructuring	   of	   the	   power	   relations	   between	   the	   political	   centre	   and	   the	  cities	  and	  regions.	  The	  genie	  may	  be	  out	  of	  the	  bottle,	  and	  perhaps	  at	  last	  we	  may	  see	  a	  new	  spatial	   literacy	  emerging	  within	  Government	  over	   its	   role	   in	  shaping	  and	  reshaping	  the	  national	  space	  economy;	  in	  effect	  an	  historic	  shift	  in	  one	  of	  the	  ‘large	  structures’	  that	  shapes	  the	  UK’s	  economic	  landscape.	  	  How	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this	   new	   structure	   develops,	   and	   how	   far	   it	   succeeds,	   under	   a	   continuing	  regime	  of	  overall	  national	  fiscal	  austerity	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  	  Nevertheless,	  what	  this	  juncture	  opens	  up,	  not	  just	  in	  the	  UK	  context,	  but	  on	  a	  wider	  front,	  is	  a	  major	  opportunity	  for	  regional	  studies	  analysts	  and	  economic	  geographers	   to	   make	   a	   convincing	   case	   for	   tackling	   uneven	   regional	  development.	  What	   I	  have	  tried	  to	  argue	   in	  this	  paper	   is	   for	   these	  groups	  to	  step	  back	   from	  their	  existing	  diversity	  of	  concepts,	  approaches	  and	  schemas	  and	   consider	   how	   this	   plethora	   of	   ideas	  might	   be	   combined,	   integrated	   and	  synthesised	   in	   order	   both	   to	   focus	   more	   explicitly	   on	   uneven	   regional	  development	   as	   a	   systemic	   problem,	   and	   thereby	   to	   give	   greater	   coherence,	  explanatory	   power	   and	   policy	   weight	   to	   their	   work.	   	   To	  my	  mind	   this	   will	  entail	   grounding	   our	   ideas	   within	   an	   encompassing	   framework	   that	   is	  evolutionary-­‐historical	   in	   orientation,	   that	   takes	   political	   and	   institutional	  structures	   as	   foundational,	   which	   works	   with	   whole	   systems	   and	   not	   just	  specific	   parts,	   and	  which	   is	   therefore	  holistic	   in	   ambition.	   	   This	   is	   no	   trivial	  task.	  One	  thing	  is	  certain:	  it	  has	  to	  be	  a	  collective	  enterprise.	  I	  return	  to	  where	  I	   began,	   the	   call	   from	   Lösch	   to	   “let	   space-­‐conditioned	   particularity	   grow,	  without	  letting	  the	  whole	  run	  wild”.	  As	  he	  says,	  that	  is	  “political	  art”.	  But	  that	  political	   art	   requires	   a	   convincing	   and	   relevant	   conceptual	   and	   empirical	  foundation.	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  Ann	  Markusen’s	  complaint	  about	  ‘policy	  distance’	  in	  regional	  studies	  still	  has	  force.	  Regional	  studies	  may	  have	  moved	  closer	  to	  addressing	   specific	   policy	   relevant	   issues	   –	   how	   to	   promote	   local	   clusters,	  regional	   innovation,	   better	   supply	   networks,	   and	   so	   on	   -­‐	   but	   it	   is	   still	   at	  considerable	   remove	   from	   tackling	   the	   really	  big	  question	  of	   ‘combined	  and	  uneven	   regional	   development’	   in	   our	   crisis-­‐prone,	   globalising	   age.	   	   This,	   for	  me,	  is	  the	  real	  challenge	  for	  regional	  studies.	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